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THE ROLE OF ARTICLE III COURTS
IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Tung Yin*
INTRODUCTION
After determining that the terrorist group Al Qaeda was behind the devastating
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, the United
States launched a counterattack against Al Qaeda bases located within Afghanistan,
as well as that country's Taliban rulers who had sheltered the terrorists. Within
weeks, the United States had ousted the Taliban from power and routed out Al
Qaeda, though notably, many of Al Qaeda's top leaders remained on the loose.
Nevertheless, the United States and its Afghan ally, the Northern Alliance, captured
a number of suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.
The United States released many of these prisoners after the end of the direct
fighting, but it also transported hundreds of others halfway across the world to the
U.S. military base located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since 1903, pursuant to an
agreement following the end of the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United
States has leased Guantanamo Bay from Cuba.' The lease is peculiar in that it
continues unless both parties agree to terminate it.2 Thus, the United States has
maintained the base throughout Fidel Castro's reign over Cuba, despite Castro's
avowed opposition
Initially, the United States kept the suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters at
a facility dubbed "Camp X-Ray." This facility resembled a dog pound more than
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. J.D., 1995, University of
California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Thanks to Ann Althouse, Eric Andersen, Randy Bezanson,
Stephanos Bibas, Arthur Bonfield, Bill Buss, Jill Gaulding, Kevin Heller, Peter Oh, Todd
Pettys, John Reitz, Alexander Somek, and Ethan Stone for their invaluable feedback, and to
John Monroe ('06) and Jason Sullivan ('06) for their research assistance. All errors remain
the author's.
' See Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S.
No. 418 [hereinafter 1903 Agreement]; see also Lease of Certain Areas for Naval or Coaling
Stations, July 2, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 426 [hereinafter 1903 Lease]; Relations with
Cuba, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, 48 Stat. 1682 [hereinafter 1934 Treaty].
2 See 1934 Treaty, supra note 1, at art. III.
In fact, Cuba has refused to cash the lease checks issued by the United States. See
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1294 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Statement by the Government
of Cuba to the National and International Public Opinion, Center for International Policy's
Cuba Program (Jan. 11,2002), athttp://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/cubanstatement.htm).
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a prison, as it was little more than wire cages placed together underneath the blazing
Cuban sun.4 Four months later, the detainees were transferred to "Camp Delta."
Apparently modeled after the so-called "SuperMax" maximum security peni-
tentiaries in the United States, Camp Delta consists of detention cells that measure
six feet, eight inches by eight feet.' Since then, over one hundred of the detainees
have been released or repatriated to their home countries to be detained there.6
However, as of mid-2004, approximately six hundred individuals remained detained
at Camp Delta.'
Criticism of the United States' continued detention of the suspected Al Qaeda
and Taliban fighters has been intense, to say the least. Camp Delta has been de-
scribed as a "legal black hole," "legal limbo," and even "gulag." 8 British House of
Lords member Johan Steyn summed up the nature of the criticism by calling the
conditions at Camp Delta "utter lawlessness." 9 Lead counsel in one litigated case
' See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs & Viveca Novak, Inside "The Wire," TIME, Dec. 8, 2003, at
40, 42.
' See Ted Conover, In the Land of Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, § 6
(Magazine) at 40.
6 See News Release, Departmentt of Defense, Detainee Transfer Completed (Apr. 2,
2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040402-0505.html.
7Id.
8 Kate Allen, U.S. Administration Should Think Again About the Legal Black Hole
Created at Guantanamo, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 14, 2004, at 18 (letter to the editor by
the Director of Amnesty International describing the "legal black hole" at Guantanamo);
Sidney Blumenthal, This Is the New Gulag: Bush Has Created a Global Network of Extra-
Legal and Secret U.S. Prisons with Thousands of Inmates, GuARDIAN, May 6, 2004, at 24
(describing the prison system as "what is in effect a gulag" and quoting Human Rights
Watch's characterization of the prison system as a "legal black hole"); Matthew Hay
Brown, Detainees Await an Unknown Fate; Hundreds of Men Captured by Allied Forces in
Afghanistan Remain in Custody, Uncharged, at the U.S. Navy Base in Cuba, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 20, 2003, at Al (quoting "[a] panel of senior judges in Britain" who
described the Guantanamo base as a "legal black hole"); Katy Daigle, Reporters Tour
Guantanamo Prison Camp, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2002 (quoting UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello) ("[H]ow long can you keep a
person in legal limbo?"), 2002 WL 103840878; Kenneth Roth, America's Guilt: The
Prisoners in a Legal Black Hole, TIMES (London), Nov. 21,2003, at 28; Richard A. Serrano,
U.S. Appellate Court Rules Against Guantanamo Detainees, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at
A19 (quoting Amnesty International spokesman, Alistair Hodgett) ("To hold people without
charge and without access to legal counsel risks the creation of an American gulag."); U.N.
Rights Chief Lashes Guantanamo Detainee Ruling, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2003 (quoting UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello, who warned against keeping
detainees in a "judicial 'black hole'), Factiva, doc. Lba0000020030313dz3d00t61; James
Vicini, U.S. Top Court to Decide Guantanamo Detainees' Cases, REUTERS, Nov. 10, 2003,
(quoting Amnesty International), Factiva, doc. LBA00000200311 10dzba002lj.
' Top U.K. Judge Slams Camp Delta, BBC NEWS (U.K. Edition), Nov. 26, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/lhiluk..politics/3238624.stm.
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involving Camp Delta referred to Guantanamo Bay as a "law-free zone" where the
United States has "dispens[ed] with the Geneva Conventions as a mere legalism and
turn[ed] its back on our own military regulations... creat[ing] a culture of dis-
respect for the law."1
Litigation challenging the Bush administration's actions ensued despite the fact
that none of the Guantanamo detainees had access to lawyers. Friends or relatives
of a number of detainees filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, challenging their
detention with district courts in the District of Columbia and the Central District of
California."' During this same time, the administration was also detaining two
American citizens, Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi, at navy brigs in the United
States; they too filed habeas petitions.' Padilla had been arrested as a material
witness on May 8, 2002 at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, just as he de-
planed a flight from Pakistan. A month later, while a motion to vacate the material
witness warrant was pending before a district court, President Bush designated
Padilla an "enemy combatant" and ordered him detained by the military. 3 Hamdi
was captured in Afghanistan in late 2001 by the Northern Alliance, which turned
him over to the United States; he was sent to detention at Guantanamo Bay in
January 2002, but when the military learned that he was a U.S. citizen, he was
transferred to a navy brig in April 2002." Like Padilla, he was detained in military
custody as an "enemy combatant."
Issuing decisions in all three cases on June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court
asserted a role for itself in the war on terror.' 5 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,16 a badly
fractured Court cobbled together a majority to remand the case with directions
to the lower court to provide Hamdi - due to his American citizenship - with a
"fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
10 Thomas B. Wilner, Law-Free Zone, WALLST. J., May 13, 2004, at A12 (op-ed by lead
counsel in Al Odah v. United States).
" Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub norn., Rasul v.
Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 321
F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp.
2d 1064 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004) (transferring case to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia).
12 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir.
2003), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir.
2003), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
13 Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715. The government appeared to believe that Padilla was
engagel on a mission with Al Qaeda to build a "dirty bomb" and set it off in an American
city. See Eric Lichtblau et al., U.S. Citizen Accused of Planning an Attack Using a 'Dirty'
Bomb, L.A. TIMEs, June 11, 2002, at Al.
'4 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2636 (2004).
's See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711; Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633; Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686.
16 124 S. Ct. 2633.
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decisionmaker."' 7 Of the six Justices who made up that majority, however, two
Justices specifically disagreed with.the other four about the government's power to
detain citizens as enemy combatants. Those. two (Justices Souter and Ginsburg)
joined the other four solely to provide a majority to remand the matter for a
hearing. 8 Meanwhile, in Rumsfeld v. Padilla,'9 the Court held, by a five to four
vote, that the appropriate respondent was not Secretary Rumsfeld, but the navy
commander supervising the brig in which Padilla was detained, and that the
Southern District of New York, where Padilla filed his petition, lacked territorial
jurisdiction over that commander.2' Therefore, the Court dismissed Padilla's habeas
petition without prejudice.2 Finally, in Rasul v. Bush,22 the Court held, six to three,
that the suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters detained at Guantanamo Bay have
a statutory right to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus to test the legality of their
confinement.23 Various groups immediately praised the decisions as "a very sting-
ing and watershed defeat ' 24 for the administration and as a "complete win'25 for the
detainees. Conventional wisdom suggested that President Bush had suffered "a
major blow' 26 and the "most damaging legal defeat since he assumed office, 27 and
had been "rebuffed" by the Court.28
In this Article, I conclude that Rasul is far from being the major defeat to the ad-
ministration that it has been portrayed as. It is true that Rasul may have prompted the
administration's decision to convene combatant status review hearings to evaluate
the detainees' combatant classification. And while those hearings have been criti-
cized as "sham hearings" or even as efforts to undermine the Court's decisions,29 the
17 Id. at 2648.
's Id. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
19 124 S. Ct. 2711.
20 Id. at 2721-22.
2' Given the decision in Hamdi, however, the administration's victory would be short
lived. See Padilla v. Hanft, No. Civ.A. 2:04-2221-26A, 2005 WL 465691 (D.S.C. Feb. 28,
2005) (granting Padilla's petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
22 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
23 Id. at 2698.
24 Tony Mauro, Court Affirms Due Process Rights of Enemy Combatants, N.Y.L.J., June
29, 2004, at col. 4 (quoting ACLU director Steve Shapiro).
25 Charles Lane, Suspects Can't Be Held in Legal Limbo: "Enemy Combatants" Can
Challenge Detentions, Get Legal Counsel, Court Rules, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul).
June 29, 2004, at Al.
26 Alan Freeman, Top U.S. Court Undercuts Bush: Guantanamo Detainees Have Right
To Question Status Before Neutral Court, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 29, 2004, at A28.
27 Andrew Buncombe, Court Defies White House with Ruling on Prisoners, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), June 29, 2004, at 24.
28 Gail Gibson, Bush Rebuffed on Detention of Terror Suspects, BALTIMORE SUN, June
29, 2004, at LA.
29 See infra note 431.
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habeas corpus and procedural due process jurisprudence suggest that hearings, per-
haps with some adjustments, will satisfy the government's obligations under Rasul.3 °
First, I will show how Rasul used a dubious interpretation of the federal habeas
corpus statute to reach the conclusion that the Guantanamo detainees have a right
to petition for writs of habeas corpus. The majority opinion takes a "kitchen sink"
approach, holding that, (a) as a matter of statutory interpretation, the federal habeas
corpus statute gives federal courts jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by aliens
detained outside the United States - at least, those held on Guantanamo Bay;3' (b)
the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes is inapplicable
because the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay;
and (c) because the Secretary of Defense is deemed to be the custodian against
whom the writ would be issued, there is nothing extraterritorial (or even extraordi-
nary) about the decision to entertain petitions brought by the Guantanamo detainees.
I then analyze the issue left open by Rasul: what exactly are the cognizable
claims that Guantanamo detainees could raise in their habeas petitions? Most
notably, Rasul cannot be read as authorizing federal courts to hold hearings to
determine the combatant status of each detainee, as such "actual innocence" claims
are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus.32 While a due process claim would be
cognizable, the hearing boards formed by the Department of Defense shortly after
the Rasul decision probably provide sufficient procedural due process, such that the
detainees will be unable to claim that they are being detained in violation of the Due
Process Clause.
Given that federal courts entertaining habeas petitions by the detainees will
likely dismiss the petitions, it is reasonable to wonder what the Court has accom-
plished. Rasul reflects a judgment by the Court that the alternative to assuming
jurisdiction over habeas petitions - specifically, leaving the matter to the political
branches - is inadequate because those branches will not respond to the concerns
of nonresident aliens. Habeas corpus is the only weapon available to the Court in
forcing the political branches to act; however, Rasul does not necessarily reflect a
desire or the Court's willingness to assume a co-equal role in the war on terrorism.
Rather, the Court's decision is best understood as a reminder to the President and
Congress that they need to ensure that there is some process to address individual
concerns. Due process being flexible, that process will necessarily vary depending
on the circumstances. If we were detaining 20,000 prisoners of war in a nation-state
conflict, those prisoners would presumably be entitled to much less process than the
595 detainees at Guantanamo Bay would be entitled to given the practical problems
of providing equivalent levels of due process in the two scenarios.
30 See infra Part II.B.2.
31 The significance of Guantanamo Bay as the detention location remains unclear, given
the Court's subsequent assertion of jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense.
32 See infra Part II.A.
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I. THE FEDERAL HABEAS STATUTE: "WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE JURISDICTIONS"
Habeas corpus has been described as "[t]he most important human rights
provision in the Constitution. ' 3 The federal habeas corpus statute currently reads
in relevant part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit
judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the
district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless ... (3) [he] is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States."
The writ of habeas corpus historically has been the vehicle for a person detained by
the government to challenge the legality of that detention in court. As the Supreme
Court explained in Fay v. Noia,36 the "root principle [of the writ] is that in a civilized
society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's
imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the funda-
mental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release."37
This right has not been limited to citizens. An alien facing deportation also has the
statutory right to seek review of the deportation order via a habeas petition.3"
3 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Coristitution, 32 B.U.
L. REv. 143 (1952).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), (c) (1994).
31 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,301 (2001) ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest."); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ('The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve
detention by executive authorities without judicial trial."); Paul M. Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963)
(arguing that habeas challenges to judicially imposed confinement - for example, sentences
following convictions - were intended to be limited to challenging the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court, and not the underlying judgment itself).
36 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
31 Id. at 402.
31 See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 309; Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953);
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1948).
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A. The Initial Extraterritorial Decisions
It is the phrase "within their respective jurisdictions" that lies at the crux of the
Court's decision in Rasul.39 When habeas petitions were brought by persons
detained within the United States, that phrase presented few problems of inter-
pretation. A state prisoner seeking habeas relief would simply file his or her petition
in the district court where he or she was being incarcerated. The custodian of the
prisoner, typically the warden, would therefore physically be present within the
district court's jurisdiction, and hence "within [its] respective jurisdiction."'
Deciding in which court to file a petition was not always so easy, however, and
in Ahrens v. Clark,41 the Court held that detention of immigrants on Ellis Island was
not within the respective jurisdiction of the Washington, D.C. district court because
the petitioners were not physically present in the district court's territorial
jurisdiction - the District of Columbia.42 The proper district in which to file the
habeas petition was the Eastern District of New York, which had territorial
jurisdiction over Ellis Island." A subsequent case, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court,' clarified that "respective jurisdictions" focused on the custodian, not the
petitioner, because the writ, if issued, directed the custodian to release the
petitioner.4 5 In most instances, the detainee and the custodian will be in the same
district, but in Braden, the petitioner, who was incarcerated in Alabama, sought to
challenge a detainer lodged against him with a Kentucky court. He filed his petition
with the district court in the Western District of Kentucky, rather than in a district
court in Alabama, where he was being held. 6 The Court held, sensibly, that the
choice of the court was proper, as the Western District of Kentucky could reach the
Kentucky state court by service of process.47 Moreover, as a matter of forum
convenience, the Western District of Kentucky was far preferable to a district in
Alabama because the witnesses (apart from the petitioner) and documents were
located in Kentucky.48
With extraterritorial detention, a problem arises as to which district court, if any,
would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition challenging such
" 124 S. Ct. at 2688 (quoting Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192).
40 See id.
41 335 U.S. 188.
42 Id. at 189, 192.
41 See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
44 id.
41 Id. at 494-95 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(a)).
46 Id. at 484.
47 Id. at 500. The Court also based its holding on several intervening extraterritorial cases,
such as Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955), and Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948). Braden, 410 U.S. at 498.
48 Id. at 493-94.
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detention. Both the detainee and the custodian (at least, the immediate custodian)
might be out of reach of service of process by any district court. This problem could
have arisen during World War I, but surprisingly did not reach the Court until after
the end of World War II.
In the initial post-World War 11 prisoner cases, such as Ex parte Betz,49 the
Court declared a lack of jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by American
soldiers and civilians detained in Europe and Japan."0 In Betz, the Court stated only
that leave to file the petition was "denied for want of original jurisdiction."5 This
somewhat cryptic passage suggests that the problem with the petitions was that they
had been filed directly with the Court, thereby attempting to invoke the Court's
original jurisdiction. The problem arises because Article I1 specifies that the
Court's original jurisdiction is limited to cases involving states or ambassadors as
parties." Since Marbury v. Madison53 held that Congress had no power to add to
or subtract from the Court's original jurisdiction,54 and because the habeas petitions
by the prisoners did not involve ambassadors or states, the case could not come
before the Court on original jurisdiction. 5" This reading is confirmed by the sub-
sequent case of Everett v. Truman,6 which cites Betz along with Article In, section
2, clause 2.-"
49 329 U.S. 672 (1946).
'0 For specific details about Betz and the petitioners in the companion cases, see Charles
Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, I STAN. L. REV. 587,
591-92 (1949).
51 Betz, 329 U.S. at 672.
52 U.S. CONST. art. III.
5' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 174 ("If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction,
where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of
jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.").
" This explanation is problematic, however, because in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75 (1807), the Court (per Chief Justice Marshall) held that it was an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction for the Court to review an original habeas petition. See generally Eric
M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex parte Bollman
and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas CorpusforState Prisoners in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 558-61 (2000).
56 334 U.S. 824 (1948). Everett was an American colonel assigned to serve as the defense
lawyer for seventy-four German soldiers accused of war crimes during the Battle of the
Bulge. See Fairman, supra note 50, at 597.
" However, this reading cannot be squared with Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at
101, which held that the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction, when
it acted on habeas petitions, even those filed directly with it, because the Court was
reviewing the judgment of an inferior court. Perhaps what the Court meant in Betz, and
subsequent cases, was that the direct petitions were appellate in nature, but that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to review decisions of military tribunals, which were not inferior courts
1068
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The subsequent cases in which the Court did hear habeas petitions brought by
American citizens detained outside the United States, Burns v. Wilson5" and United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,5 9 shed precious little light on the jurisdictional basis
for entertaining such habeas petitions. This is because both cases essentially assume
that statutory jurisdiction existed, in part because of the respondents' failure to argue
that the court lacked jurisdiction. For example, the entire discussion of jurisdiction
in Burns consisted of the following:
In this case, we aredealing with habeas corpus applicants who
assert - rightly or wrongly - that they have been imprisoned
and sentenced to death as a result of proceedings which denied
them basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The federal
civil courts have jurisdiction over such applications. By statute,
Congress has charged them with the exercise of that power.'
To support this assertion, the Court cited the federal habeas statute and In re
Yamashita.6 1 Yamashita was a post-World War II case in which a military tribunal
sentenced a Japanese general to death for violating the laws of war by failing to
control his troops in the Philippine Islands.62 Held in the Philippines, the tribunal
was commissioned by the Commanding General of the U.S. Western Pacific Army
Forces, who was the named respondent. The sum total of the Court's discussion of
statutory jurisdiction to hear the petition is no more illuminating than that found in
Burns.63 Moreover, Yamashita had two avenues to the Court: direct petition for
habeas and petition for certiorari to review the denial of his habeas petition by the
Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 6 Thus, Congress arguably
subject to review by the Court. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 203 (1948) (per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these peti-
tioners is not a tribunal of the United States.").
58 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
59 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
0 Bums, 346 U.S. at 139 (citation omitted).
6 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
62 id.
63 See id. at 8.
Congress conferred on the courts no power to review their deter-
minations save only as it has granted judicial power "to grant writs of
habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of the
restraint of liberty." The courts may inquire whether the detention
complained of is within the authority of those detaining the petitioner.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 452) (citation omitted).
4 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 349 (1946), since repealed, the Court had jurisdiction to review
decisions from the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Philippines during the time
that the Philippine Islands were a U.S. territory.
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had established a clear jurisdictional path in Yamashita for the possibility of Court
review, whereas in Burns, no such clear path existed.
Toth presented a different scenario. In this case, the petitioner sought review of
his detention in Korea, following court martial conviction; however, he had been
arrested in Pittsburgh and whisked out of the country to stand trial in the court-
martial.6" Toth might be read, therefore, as implicitly holding that the government
cannot frustrate the purpose of the habeas statute by transferring detainees within its
control from within the territorial jurisdiction of some federal court to a place
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court.'
Ultimately, the prior doctrine regarding the actual statutory jurisdiction of
federal courts to hear habeas petitions brought by American citizens to challenge
extraterritorial detention was frustratingly threadbare, existing more by judicial fiat
than by clear reasoning. Yet, as it turns out, that threadbare assertion - unbriefed
and unchallenged - has turned out to be the key to the Court's ability to entertain
the habeas petitions brought by the Guantanamo detainees.67
For aliens detained outside the United States prior to Rasul, the story was
different. Initially, hundreds of German and Japanese soldiers sought review of their
war crimes convictions,68 and just as in the initial cases of American citizens, the
Court denied the habeas petitions for lack of original jurisdiction. 69 Finally, in
Johnson v. Eisentrager,7" the Court provided the most detailed articulation of the
theory behind denying nonresident aliens outside the United States access to Article
11 courts. The defendants in Eisentrager were twenty-one German nationals
convicted in a post-World War II U.S. military tribunal for violating the laws of
war by continuing to fight against the United States after Germany had already
65 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 (1955).
66 Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2729 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(arguing for an exception to the immediate custodian rule "if there is an indication that the
Government's purpose in removing a prisoner were to make it difficult for his lawyer to
know where the habeas petition should be filed"); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 305-07
(1944) (holding that the district court retained jurisdiction over habeas petitions despite
petitioner's being moved from California to Utah, because a custodian remained within the
Northern District of California). But see United States ex rel. Lynn v. Downer, 322 U.S. 756,
756-57 (1944); United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 319 U.S. 755,755 (1943) (both cases
dismissed the petitions as moot when petitioner was no longer in particular respondent's
custody).
67 See infra Part I.B.
68 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), is not an exception, as the petitioners in that case
(seven German soldiers, one of whom was a dual U.S.-German citizen) were captured on
U.S. soil.
69 See, e.g., Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1948); In re Eichel, 333 U.S. 865 (1948);
Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789 (1947).
0 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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surrendered unconditionally.7 They petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, naming
various high-level U.S. government officials (though not their actual custodian,
who was beyond service of process) as defendants and alleging that their trials,
convictions, and imprisonment violated the Constitution, federal law, and the
Geneva Convention.72
Although the D.C. district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reinstated the petition on the ground
that the federal courts were available to redress violations of the Constitution or
federal law even where no statutory jurisdiction existed to issue the habeas writ.7 3
The Supreme Court, per Justice Jackson, reversed.74 As a prelude, the Court noted
that no court, U.S. or foreign, recognizing the writ of habeas corpus had ever
extended it to "an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his
captivity, has been within [the] territorial jurisdiction" of this nation.7" While lawful
resident aliens were entitled to some - but not all - civil rights,76 such as "full and
fair hearings" prior to deportation77 and due process of law,78 it was "the alien's
presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act" in
those cases.7 9 Justice Jackson's opinion identifies six different relevant factors for
depriving the German prisoners of the right to access United States courts:
he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there
held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and
convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside
7 Id. at 766. Specifically, the defendants spied on American forces and passed
information to the Japanese military, which was still fighting against the Allied forces. The
military courts were convened in China with the consent of the Chinese government. Id.
72 Id. at 766-67.
3 See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that (a)
constitutional prohibitions applied directly to the government without regard to territory, and
(b) if the right of habeas corpus exists, it cannot be denied through jurisdictional omission),
rev'd sub nom., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
4 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
Id. at 768.
76 Id. at 770-71 (explaining that the rights available to a resident alien "become more
extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen,
and they expand to those offull citizenship upon naturalization") (emphasis added); cf id.
at 771 ("[T]he civil and property rights of immigrants or transients of foreign nationality so
nearly approach equivalence to those of citizens, courts in peace time have little occasion to
inquire whether litigants before them are alien or citizen.").
7 See, e.g., The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
78 See, e.g., Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771.
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the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the
United States.80
Justice Black dissented. He read Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita8 2 as
standing for the proposition that enemy aliens were not barred from access to the
federal courts. 83 Ex parte Quirin, of course, is easily distinguished by noting that
the petitioners there were caught inside the United States; Yamashita could have
been a more troublesome precedent, as the petitioner was a Japanese general tried
and convicted in a military tribunal held in the Philippines after the end of World
War II. Justice Black did not, however, highlight that fact. Rather, Justice Black
phrased the operative question as: "Does a prisoner's right to test legality of a
sentence then depend on where the Government chooses to imprison him?"
'
While Justice Black agreed that enemy aliens could not use the courts to "hail
our military leaders into judicial tribunals to account for their day-to-day activities
on the battlefront," he argued that the calculus changed once the enemy nation
surrendered and was occupied by the United States.8 5 At that point, federal courts
should be able to exercise jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions "whenever any
United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land we govern."8 6
B. The Court Enters the War on Terrorism
Two years after the September 11 terrorist attacks, major terrorism cases
reached the Court. Although the Court in the past has avoided or delayed deciding
major constitutional issues raised during times of crisis, in this instance the passage
of time is largely due to the course of litigation in the lower courts. For example,
Yaser Esan Hamdi's habeas petition bounced between the district court and the
Fourth Circuit a number of times before being ripe for review by the Court.8
Similarly, Al Odah and Rasul presented the first true opportunity for the Court to
80 Id. at 777.
81 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
82 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
83 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 794 (Black, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 795. This was a verbal sleight of hand because the majority opinion did not rest
solely on the fact that petitioners were imprisoned outside the United States; rather, it was
the combination of status as nonresident enemy aliens who had been captured outside the
United States and had not set foot in the country.
8I Id. at 796.
86 Id. at 798 (citation omitted).
87 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va.), on remandfrom 296 F.3d 278
(4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d
598 (4th Cir. 2002).
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review the Guantanamo detainee situation."s This section discusses Rasul and shows
how that case fits in with - and alters - the prior habeas corpus jurisprudence.
Perhaps the biggest irony of these cases is that Shafiq Rasul, the first named
petitioner, had already been released from Guantanamo Bay by the time his case was
argued before the Court.s 9 Rasul, a British citizen, claimed to have traveled to
Pakistan after September 11, 2001 "to visit relatives. . . , explore his culture, and
continue his computer studies." 9 The Northern Alliance captured him in Pakistan
and turned him over to the United States in December 2001;9' a month later, the
United States shipped him to Guantanamo Bay. Rasul's co-petitioners, one British
citizen and two Australian citizens, made similar claims.92 All four men denied
being enemy aliens or unlawful combatants.93 The district court dismissed their
habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction, relying on Johnson v. Eisentrager, and the
D.C. Circuit affirmed.
Writing for the majority,94 Justice Stevens framed the issue as whether the
"habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive
detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and
exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty." 95 Stating the issue this way,
as opposed to the simpler "whether non-resident aliens detained outside United
States territory have statutory rights under the habeas statute," foreshadowed the
Court's distinguishing of Eisentrager. Citing the six factors that Justice Jackson had
listed in Eisentrager, Justice Stevens argued that all six factors were required before
Eisentrager would apply.96 This is an implausible reading of Eisentrager. For
example, one of the six factors was the conviction in a military court for violating
laws of war. 97 If this truly were a requirement, a nonresident enemy alien detained
88 An earlier attempt to litigate the detainees' case out of the Ninth Circuit failed for lack
of standing. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd,
310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002).
89 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686,2690 n. 1 (2004). The case remained a live controversy
because of the presence of other petitioners in Rasul, as well as those in the consolidated
case, Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
90 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 3, Rasul (No. 03-334).
91 Id. The Northern Alliance was allegedly collecting cash bounties for turning over
suspected Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters to the United States. See, e.g., Bill Dedman, U.S. To
Hold Most Detainees at Guantanamo Indefinitely, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 2004, at Al.
92 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Rasul (No. 03-334).
13 Id. at 4. However, petitioner David Hicks's father (who brought the petition on his
behalf) admitted that Hicks may havejoined the Taliban, resulting in the secondary argument
that "the Taliban had caused no American casualties." Id.
4 Justices O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens.
5 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting 1903 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. HI) (citation
omitted).
96 id. at 2693-94.
" Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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overseas as a prisoner of war would not fall within Eisentrager's bar on access to
the federal courts. Yet, given Justice Jackson's stated concern about the use of
litigation as a war-time weapon by enemy aliens,9" it is extremely unlikely that
Justice Jackson would have sanctioned the granting of the writ to all nonresident
enemy aliens who had not been tried and convicted for war crimes. 99 A more natural
reading of Eisentrager is that the conviction in military court was relevant for the
petitioners in that case precisely because they were being detained at a time when
other prisoners of war had already been repatriated to their home countries. But for
the convictions, the United States would have had no reason not to release the
Eisentrager prisoners.
Justice Stevens also pointed out that none of the Guantanamo detainees were
citizens of countries with whom the United States was at war." This too would
have surprised Justice Jackson as a basis for distinguishing Eisentrager because
Justice Jackson concluded in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei °'' that
individuals at war with the United States could be detained even if their home
countries were not."
The heart of Justice Stevens's opinion focused on the interplay among Ahrens
v. Clark,' 3 Eisentrager," and Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court. 5 Recall that
Ahrens held that the federal habeas corpus statute, in limiting authorization of the
writ to instances "within [courts'] respective jurisdiction," required that the
petitioner be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ." Justice
Stevens concluded that Eisentrager's denial of court access to the German prisoners
imprisoned outside the United States rested implicitly on this statutory jurisdiction
analysis, which was subsequently overruled by Braden.'"7 Because Eisentrager
followed Ahrens with respect to the lack of statutory jurisdiction, the Eisentrager
Court went on to decide the additional question of whether denying nonresident
aliens access to federal courts violated the Constitution.' But that additional
analysis is no longer necessary, according to Justice Stevens, because the "statutory
predicate" for the analysis is no longer valid."' 9
91 Id. at 779.
9' As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, during World War II, the United States held
about 2 million prisoners of war. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"00 Id. at 2693.
tol 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
102 See id. at 223 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I should suppose one personally at war with
our institutions might be confined, even though his state is not at war with us.").
103 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
"o4 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
105 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
Ahrens, 335 U.S. 188.
107 Braden, 410 U.S. 484.
'os Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2695.
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If Justice Stevens's premise that Braden overruled Ahrens is correct, then his
distinguishing of Eisentrager is not unreasonable. For if Eisentrager stands for the
propositions that (1) no district court had jurisdiction under the habeas statute, as
interpreted in 1950, to hear petitions brought by aliens imprisoned outside the
United States and (2) such statutory interpretation presented no constitutional
problems, then a subsequent decision that overrules the first point is functionally
the same as if Congress had amended the habeas statute in response to Ahrens.
While Congress may not constitutionally be required to extend the habeas
privilege to nonresident aliens detained outside the country, it arguably has the
power to do so.
However, as Justice Scalia persuasively demonstrated in his dissent, Justice
Stevens's reading of Braden was broader than warranted given the logical
reasoning of that case."° Braden correctly pointed out that the writ of habeas
corpus, if issued, directed the custodian to (literally) produce the petitioner."'
Thus, in Braden, the fact that the petitioner was being detained in Alabama had
no bearing on the proper district in which to file his habeas petition, given that
the "custody" that Braden complained of was the lodging of a detainer in a state
court in Kentucky to preserve the right to prosecute Braden after he was released
from the Alabama prison." 2 All that Braden need stand for is that in the un-
usual circumstance where the petitioner and custodian are in different federal
districts, the proper district in which to file the habeas petition is the one where
the latter can be located." 3 Such a reading would overrule Ahrens, but it would not
disturb Eisentrager because the custodian of the prisoners (the commandant of
Landsberg Prison in Germany) was not within the territorial jurisdiction of any
U.S. district court.
Next, Justice Stevens addressed the government's argument that, in light of the
presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes, the habeas statute
should not be interpreted to extend to petitions brought by persons outside the
United States. Justice Stevens responded that the presumption against extra-
territorial application of federal statutes did not apply because the United States,
pursuant to the 1903 Lease and the 1934 Treaty," 4 exercised exclusive jurisdiction
over Guantanamo Bay, suggesting that extension of the federal habeas statute to
detainees being held there was not extraterritorial."'
1o Id. at 2704.
... Braden, 410 U.S. at 500.
12 Braden complained that the Kentucky court was violating his right to a speedy trial by
simply lodging the detainer without taking any action. Id. at 485.
"' Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.
Ct. 2711, 2719-20 (2004).
"' See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
1'5 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696.
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Finally, Justice Stevens summarized the Court's holding:
Petitioners contend that they are being held in federal custody in
violation of the laws of the United States. No party questions
the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians.
Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more. We therefore
hold that § 2241 confers on the District Courtjurisdiction to hear
petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base." 6
This paragraph represents the entire discussion of territorial jurisdiction over the
Guantanamo detainees' custodian. This is a surprisingly truncated discussion, in
light of the Court's decision in Padilla, in which the Court dismissed Jose Padilla's
habeas petition on the ground that it should have been filed in the District of South
Carolina, not the Southern District of New York, because his immediate custodian
was Commander Melanie Marr, the commander of the navy brig at Charleston,
South Carolina."1 7 Rasul, on the other hand, tumed on the fact that district courts
could exercise jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who
presumably could order that the Guantanamo detainees be produced in court. In
Rasul, however, the Court never grappled with the fact that Secretary Rumsfeld
presumably could order Commander Marr to produce Padilla as well. Indeed, one
wonders why it was necessary for Justice Stevens to discuss the "territorial
jurisdiction" that the United States exercises over Guantanamo Bay: if Secretary
Rumsfeld is a proper respondent for habeas petitions brought by Guantanamo
detainees, then there is no extraterritorial application of the habeas statute at all; the
writ, if issued, would be directed within the United States to Secretary Rumsfeld." 8
A further problem with this superficial discussion of territorial jurisdiction is
that Justice Stevens made no effort to specify whether any particular district court
should be construed to have jurisdiction over Secretary Rumsfeld. In Demjanjuk v.
Meese," 9 Judge Bork held that an alien held in an unknown location was entitled to
challenge his deportation with a habeas petition, and that in the limited and special
circumstances, the Attorney General would be treated as the custodian, with juris-
diction in the D.C. district court.20 In other instances, however, district courts have
116 Id. at 2698 (citations omitted).
117 Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2721-22.
n' In fact, if this aspect of Rasul is to be taken seriously, then a federal court could
arguably entertain a habeas petition brought by any person detained anywhere by the United
States.
"9 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
120 Id. at 1116 (citing Exparte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327 (1973)); see also Gherebi v. Bush,
374 F.3d 727, 739, (9th Cir. 2004) (transferring habeas petition to the D.C. district court).
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not been so restrained,' thus raising venue concerns. In Braden, the Western
District of Kentucky was not only the district in which the appropriate custodian
was located, but also the most convenient forum.' Similarly, the District of
South Carolina is the most convenient forum for access to relevant witnesses
(including the petitioner) and documents for any factual disputes that may arise in
connection with Jose Padilla's habeas petition. No such district court exists with
regard to the Guantanamo detainees, though presumably the Southern District of
Florida would be the closest district to the relevant witnesses and documents. The
District of Columbia might also be a logical district given that it is the seat of the
federal government." 3 Instead, Rasul seems open to the spectacle of the govern-
ment having to respond to habeas petitions all across the country. This would not
only burden the government, but also lead to the possibility of detainees in adjacent
cells at Camp Delta having habeas petitions reviewed under significantly different
legal rules. 24 While the Court could eventually unify the resulting caselaw, it would
be more efficient to have the unification done at the appeals court level, which
would have been possible had Justice Stevens provided more of an explanation of
territorial jurisdiction.
Moreover, Judge Bork's reasoning in Demjanjuk does not translate well to the
Guantanamo detainees' situation. In Demjanjuk, there was no question that some
U.S. district was the proper one for bringing the habeas petition; however, due to the
government's actions in concealing the petitioner's actual location, neither the
petitioner's lawyer nor the court knew which district that was.2 5 The detainees, by
contrast, are in a known location that simply happens not to be within any U.S.
district. This is not to say that a judicially created rule analogous to that in
Demjanjuk could not be justified under some reasonable principle, thereby also
retroactively explaining how the Court had jurisdiction in Burns v. Wilson. 2 6 That
explanation should, however, go beyond asserting that there must be some district
in which a habeas petition can be brought. Eisentrager specifically rejects the
proposition that enemy aliens detained outside the United States have a consti-
tutional claim to access the federal courts.'27 Any such right must therefore be
121 Cf So v. Reno, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (claiming jurisdiction over the
Attorney General); Walters v. Ashcroft, 291 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same claim).
122 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 499 (1973).
123 See Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d at 1116.
124 Though it is not related to the merits of the habeas petitions, simply consider that the
D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit reached diametrically opposite conclusions about the
availability of habeas relief. Compare Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.
2003), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), with Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003),
amended, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004).
125 Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d at 1115-16.
126 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
127 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950).
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statutory in nature, conferred by Congress. While interpreting the habeas statute to
extend beyond the United States' territorial limits is not implausible, there should
be some positive reason given for that interpretation. For example, the Court could
have concluded that the phrase "within their respective jurisdiction" was ambiguous
and that it would therefore interpret the statute expansively, leaving it to Congress
to clarify the statute if Congress truly did not intend for the habeas statute to extend
to the detainees. This position might make sense if the Court believed Congress to
be institutionally incapable of taking positive action in favor of the detainees; yet,
it would allow a simple majority of Congress to undo the decision.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result of Rasul, but disagreed substantially
with Justice Stevens's analysis, particularly with regard to the reading of Ahrens and
Braden.'28 In Justice Kennedy's view, Eisentrager provided the appropriate frame-
work for deciding this case; 129 however, he would not have applied its strict bar
here because Guantanamo Bay was essentially U.S. territory, as well as far from the
battlefield, and because the detainees were facing indefinite detention with no legal
proceedings to determine their combatant status.130 This approach would provide
a more narrow resolution to the case by permitting the Guantanamo detainees to
challenge their custody while not opening the door to challenges by detainees held
elsewhere (unless, of course, "elsewhere" happens to be foreign territory over which
the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction). However, one wonders about
Justice Kennedy's assertion that the detainees face indefinite detention with no
legal proceedings to determine their combatant status. Like Justice Stevens, Justice
Kennedy appears to have conflated the distinct issues of continuing to imprison
convicted war criminals after a conflict has ended with detaining lawful combatants
during a continuing conflict. For example, a German soldier captured as a prisoner
of war in mid-1942 might have thought that he too faced indefinite detention with
no legal proceedings to determine his combatant status. Yet, it does not seem con-
sistent with Eisentrager's logic to suggest that the potentially long and uncertain
detention that this soldier faces should necessarily be a basis to challenge his
continuing detention in U.S. courts."'
128 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129 id. at 2700.
Because the prisoners in Eisentrager were proven enemy aliens found
and detained outside the United States, and because the existence of
jurisdiction would have had a clear harmful effect on the Nation's
military affairs, the matter was appropriately left to the Executive
Branch and there was no jurisdiction for the courts to hear the
prisoner's claims.
Id.
130 id.
131 See id.
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Also worth considering is the other aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion, in
which he argued that, because the terms of the treaty and lease between the United
States and Cuba are "indefinite and at the discretion of the United States. ... From
a practical perspective, the indefinite lease... has produced a place that belongs to
the United States .... 32 From a "practical perspective," Justice Kennedy may be
correct, but this is nevertheless a startling conclusion. A few Article III judges are
willing to conclude that the military base has become U.S. territory despite the fact
that the executive branch of the United States and Cuba both reject the notion that
the United States has annexed Guantanamo Bay.'33 While that conclusion is not
implausible, it is doubtful that federal courts are the appropriate bodies to draw that
conclusion, especially when this contradicts the executive branch.' 34 In an oft-
quoted passage from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,13 the Court
stated in dictum that when it came to foreign affairs, "with its important, com-
plicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation."' 3 6 Curtiss-Wright is consistent with the
political question doctrine, under which certain legal issues are deemed non-
justiciable. One category of such nonjusticiable matters are those that have "the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question."'37 Here, we have conflicting assertions by the judicial and
executive branches regarding sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. What are foreign
leaders to make of these conflicting pronouncements? This would seem to be the
prime example of the sort of judicial decision that the political question doctrine is
intended to prevent.
A more analytically rigorous approach yielding the same result can be found in
Gherebi v. Bush,38 in which Judge Reinhardt seized upon Eisentrager's use of both
"sovereignty" and "territorial jurisdiction."'139 This allowed him to read Eisentrager
132 Id.
'33 Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1312 (9th Cir. 2003) (Graber, J., dissenting).
"3 See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the sovereign, de jure
or defacto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which
by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the
judges."); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) ("And can there
be any doubt, that when the executive branch of the government, which is charged with our
foreign relations, shall in its correspondence with a foreign nation assume a fact in regard to
the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department?"). It may
well be that Justice Kennedy was simply sloppy here, using "belongs to" when he meant
"exercises territorial jurisdiction over." Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700.
1 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
136 Id. at 319.
13' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
13' 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003).
131 Id. at 1284-86.
1079
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
as holding that the latter was the key issue involved in Gherebi,'40 and to conclude
that "territorial jurisdiction is enough.' 4'
But does the United States exercise territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo
Bay? Here, Judge Reinhardt focused on the vast degree of autonomy that the
United States appeared to exercise over the military base on Guantanamo Bay,
ranging from the "complete" jurisdiction ceded by the Lease to the "exclusive
criminal jurisdiction over all persons, citizens and aliens alike, who commit crim-
inal offenses at the Base."'42 Unlike Landsberg Prison, where the United States
temporarily shared limited authority with Germany, the United States had "poten-
tially permanent exercise of complete jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo,
including the right of eminent domain.""'
The long-term downside of this approach is that arguments over whether the
United States exercises "territorial jurisdiction" or de facto "sovereignty" over
Guantanamo Bay risk distracting attention from larger legal questions. A ruling in
favor of the Camp Delta detainees simply eliminates Camp Delta from consideration
as a detention camp for future captured fighters. Rather than transport such captures
from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or wherever else, the executive branch will
simply detain them in those foreign countries. In fact, this is exactly the approach
that the Bush administration has taken with a number of high-level Al Qaeda
captives such as Ranzi Binalshibh, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Abu Zubaydah,
all of whom have been held in undisclosed locations (but presumed to be somewhere
in Pakistan or Afghanistan).' There are also reports that the United States is
detaining over three hundred persons in Afghanistan.'45
To be sure, the government had reasons for transporting captured fighters
fifteen thousand miles from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Guantanamo Bay, just
ninety miles away from the United States. Escaping from Camp Delta would be
considerably more difficult than escaping from a detention facility in Pakistan or
'40 Id. at 1287-88.
141 Id. at 1288. Judge Reinhardt went on to conclude that even if sovereignty were the
requirement, the United States had, through the terms of the Lease and subsequent conduct,
acquired sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay through a sort of international adverse
possession. Id. at 1290-96. The dissent criticized this conclusion, noting that "both parties
to the Guantanamo Lease and its associated treaties - Cuba and the United States (through
the executive branch) - maintain that Guantanamo is part of Cuba." Id. at 1312 (Graber, J.,
dissenting).
142 Id. at 1289 (describing the 1903 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. III; 1903 Lease, supra
note 1, at art. IV).
143 Id. at 1287.
'" See, e.g., Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct.
2003, at 51, 53.
145 See DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS 9
& nn.32-34 (2004), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/PDF/EndingSecretDeten-
tions.web.pdf.
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Afghanistan because Camp Delta is far away from the current theater of military
conflict and any escape or rescue attempt would have to overcome or approach by
water."4 While the government could choose some other secure island facilities,
such as the British military base on Diego Garcia, this would require agreement with
the British government. 47 Thus, denying the government the use of Guantanamo
Bay as a "lawless" enclave does force the government to choose between the
security that the island base offers and the freedom from legal scrutiny that a foreign
base offers. But it does not ensure that federal courts can avoid the question of
habeas jurisdiction over nonresident aliens detained elsewhere.
Finally, Justice Scalia dissented in Rasul and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.4 8 He pointed out that the actual text of the federal
habeas statute implied that the custodian must be in some federal district, 49 thus
explaining Braden as a special situation where the custodian and petitioner were
located in different districts. 5 ' However, the strict textualist approach fails to
explain cases such as Burns v. Wilson, 5' in which American citizens detained
outside the United States (and thus detained by a custodian outside any federal
district) were nevertheless permitted to file habeas petitions, and Justice Scalia was
forced to explain those cases away as an "atextual extension.' 52 He closed his
dissent with an appeal to legislative prerogative:
Congress is in session. If it wished to change federal judges'
habeas jurisdiction from what this Court had previously held that
to be, it could have done so. And it could have done so by
intelligent revision of the statute, instead of by today's clumsy,
countertextual reinterpretation that confers upon wartime
prisoners greater habeas rights than domestic detainees.' 53
' See, e.g., Tania Branigan & Vikram Dodd, The Bitterest Betrayal, THE GUARDIAN,
July 19, 2003, at 25 ("Guantanamo Bay, located on the south-eastern tip of Cuba, is
reachable only by a US military flight: its remoteness adds to its security."); Scott Higham
et al., A Holding Cell In War on Terror: Guantanamo Bay Prison Represents a Problem
That's Tough To Get Out Of, WASH. POST, May 2,2004, at Al (noting that Guantanamo Bay
was more attractive than detention facilities in Asia, which were deemed vulnerable).
141 See Higham et al., supra note 146.
14' Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149 Id.
'5o See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
'1' 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
l52 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 2711 (citation omitted). By that, Justice Scalia meant that a Guantanamo detainee
can file his habeas petition in any district, whereas Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen detained inside
the United States, has to file his petition in the District of South Carolina, in which his
immediate custodian can be found.
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It is important to keep in mind the limited nature of the Rasul Court's holding.
By resting on an interpretation of the federal habeas statute, the Court avoided
having to decide whether nonresident aliens detained outside the United States
pursuant to military combat authorized by Congress have constitutional rights. In
addition, the Court's holding - that the detainees have a statutory right to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus - should not be viewed as more monumental than it
really is. As discussed in Part H below, the right to file a petition for habeas corpus
guarantees a detainee only that a federal court will ultimately decide whether that
detainee is being held in violation of federal law, the Constitution, or a treaty; it does
not guarantee that the detainee is entitled to have a federal court determine that he
is not a combatant. Furthermore, by resting on statutory interpretation, the Court
implicitly leaves Congress the final say on whether nonresident aliens can petition
for writs of habeas corpus.
II. PREDICTING THE FUTURE ROLE OF ARTICLE Il COURTS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Regardless of whether one believes that the Court should have reached a
different result in Rasul, each Guantanamo detainee now has a right to file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, seeking to show that he is being held in
violation of federal law, the Constitution, or treaty."5 This legal victory may well
be less significant than is apparent. This section analyzes the most likely claims to
predict the future role of federal courts in the war on terrorism and concludes that,
in light of the planned hearing boards to view each detainee's combatant status,
habeas relief is unlikely to result in release from Camp Delta.
This section relies largely, though not exclusively, on the habeas corpus doctrine
as developed in review of state court convictions. It is a fair question whether these
precedents are applicable to the situation of review of the executive branch's
detentions of suspected combatants. The habeas decisions involving state prisoners
rest crucially on specific notions of federalism and comity. Paul M. Bator's article,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,'55 laid out
his central thesis: so long as state courts are competent to find facts and decide legal
issues (including matters of federal law) - and in Bator's view, they are - the
scope of habeas review should be narrow because there is no reason to believe that
expansive relitigation would lead to more accurate results.'56 Defenders of an
expansive scope of habeas review challenge this assumption of parity, arguing that
154 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004).
'" Bator, supra note 55.
16 Id. at 451.
1082
[Vol. 13:1035
ARTICLE I COURTS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
state courts are inferior at adjudicating federal claims.' The debate is fascinating
but ultimately inconclusive, and it is easy to lose sight of some pragmatic points.
As Ann Althouse points out, the real issue is not whether state courts are better or
worse than federal courts at adjudicating federal issues, but rather, whether state
courts are "good enough."' 5 8 Current habeas corpus doctrine, with respect to peti-
tions brought by prisoners convicted in state courts, assumes that state courts are
"good enough." This assumption explains the deference owed to state court findings
of fact provided the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those
factual disputes.
However, the Court has held that the federalism and comity concerns in federal-
state relations also apply to military court proceedings.'5 9 In part, this holding
rests on an analogy between the exhaustion requirements in both habeas review of
state court decisions as well as federal court review of decisions by administrative
agencies. In both instances, the body whose decision is being reviewed by the
federal court is presumed to have competent fact-finding ability, if not expertise.' 60
The Court concluded that this analogy also applied to court-martial proceedings:
"implicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the Code is the view that the
military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will perform its
assigned task.' 16 ' The Court also noted that the military is its own society, entitled
to an appropriate level of deference and comity. 162
While we are not concerned here with courts-martial, which are used to
prosecute U.S. military personnel for violations of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, much of the reasoning underlying federal court-military court comity is
applicable to the treatment of suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters detained at
Guantanamo Bay. It is true that there is no congressional scheme in place, only an
executive branch order, and thus no explicit congressional judgment as to the
adequacy of the process in place. This difference might warrant greater scrutiny as
'57 See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 161-62 (1994);
William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 946 (1964);
Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
579, 677-85 (1982).
5 Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L. Rv. 953, 961 (1991).
But as long as the state courts are good enough, even if they fall short
of parity, the interest in enforcing rights supports allocating some
federal questions to state court in order to relieve federal courts of the
burden of unnecessarily duplicative cases and to take advantage of the
plentiful state courts, training them to handle rights claims routinely,
as they arise in context.
Id.
... See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756-58 (1975).
'60 Id. at 756.
161 Id. at 758.
162 id.
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to the fact-finding competence of the hearing boards. For example, if the President
had ordered that inexperienced, low-ranking soldiers were to adjudicate complex
questions of military law, a habeas court might reasonably conclude that prior
habeas decisions involving state prisoners - and in particular, the deference that
such decisions afford state court decisions - should not be applied. The hearing
boards, however, are comprised of officers, one of whom is a member of the Judge
Advocate General, and they are tasked with a matter that is at the core of the
military: determining who is the enemy.'63 Just as the discipline and punishment of
military personnel is deemed a matter entitling military courts to comity, so too
should determinations by the military about who is the enemy.
A. Actual Innocence Claims
Preliminarily, based on analogy to habeas cases involving state prisoners, we
can be fairly certain that Rasul does not open the door for federal courts to
determine the combatant status of each detainee. As the Court has emphasized,
habeas corpus does not exist to correct errors of fact,'6 and thus a detainee cannot
simply allege that he was wrongly classified as a combatant. Rather, the detainee
must allege custody in violation of federal law, the Constitution, or a treaty. When
commentators say that the detainees "can now have their day in court,' 65 one should
be aware that the phrase "day in court" can have quite different meanings.
The federal habeas statute contemplates that the federal district court may
conduct some fact finding, as there is a provision for testimony and deposition."' 6
With leave of the court, a habeas petitioner can even invoke discovery processes
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 167 However, the habeas statute also
presumes the correctness of facts found in state courts, leaving it to the petitioner to
rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.6 6 The ability of the
habeas petitioner to attempt to rebut the presumption of correctness of factual
findings does not mean, however, that the petitioner gets to retry the entire issue of
his guilt so long as he can prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence.
163 See infra notes 335-42 and accompanying text.
'6' See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) ("[F]ederal habeas courts sit to
ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution - not to correct
errors of fact."); In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 305 (1888) ("[T]he writ of habeas corpus does
not perform the office of a writ of error or an appeal.").
165 David G. Savage, High Court Says Detainees Have Right to Hearing, L.A. TIMES, June
29, 2004, at Al (quoting James Fellner of Human Rights Watch).
'66 See 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (2000) ("On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence
may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit.").
167 See Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
168 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000).
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Consider Townsend v. Sain,6 9 which established that "a federal evidentiary
hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably
found the relevant facts."'70 Townsend, in fact, had received a hearing in state court
on his unsuccessful objection to the admission of his confession, which he argued
had been obtained involuntarily. 7 ' In applying its new rule, the Court (per Chief
Justice Warren) concluded that it was impossible to tell whether the state court had
applied appropriate federal standards for determining the voluntariness of the
confession, 7 2 and more significantly, whether the court had been presented with
evidence that the petitioner had been given a "truth serum."'73 The Court remanded
for an evidentiary hearing, but the scope of the hearing was not to litigate the
ultimate issue of Townsend's guilt; rather, it was to resolve the voluntariness of his
confession. 174 If the result of the hearing was that the confession was found to be
not voluntary, then Townsend would be released unless the State gave him a new
trial (in which it would not be able to use the confession). On the other hand, if the
result of the hearing was that the confession was found to be voluntary, then
Townsend would remain in prison. In no event, however, would the hearing de-
termine Townsend's guilt or innocence. Thus, a detainee might be entitled to an
evidentiary hearing in federal court on a habeas petition, but only to resolve disputed
facts relevant to a constitutional claim. 75
169 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
170 Id. at 312-13 (citation omitted). Townsend set forth six situations in which a federal
hearing was required:
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by
the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the
state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there
is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the
material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing;
or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford
the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313. Congress later essentially codified this aspect of Townsend's holding, albeit with
a presumption of correctness. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1104
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994)). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, subsequently amended § 2254 to
its current form, and Keeney overruled Townsend to hold that a state prisoner who failed to
present a factual dispute for determination in state court was required to show cause and
prejudice for such failure to obtain a federal court hearing. See Keeney, 504 U.S. at 11.
'7' Townsend, 372 U.S. at 295-96.
172 Id. at 320.
'" Id. at 321-22.
14 Id. at 322 ("[Tlhe petitioner, and the State, must be given the opportunity to present
other testimonial and documentary evidence relevant to the disputed issues.") (emphasis
added).
' For example, a detainee might allege that he was detained without being afforded due
process, and a factual dispute might arise as to the actual procedures used.
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Moreover, state prisoner cases suggest that a detainee would not be entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus based on a freestanding allegation of not being a combat-
ant. While an allegation of innocence can play a role in the Court's traditional
habeas corpus jurisprudence, it is generally viewed as a "gateway" through which
otherwise barred legal claims can be revived. 7 6 The Court has not, however, viewed
innocence itself as a ground for relief.'77
The innocence "gateway" involves claims that have been procedurally
defaulted - that is, claims that could have been, but were not, raised in an earlier
forum (usually, but not necessarily in state courts). A typical example might be
the failure to object to evidence at trial, only to argue later in a habeas petition that
the admission of the evidence rendered the trial unconstitutional. In Wainwright v.
Sykes, 8 the Court held that procedurally defaulted claims would be barred on
habeas unless the prisoners could show "cause" and "prejudice" for the default. 7 9
In Murray v. Carrier,18 0 the Court created an exception to the cause and prejudice
rule: a prisoner who could not show cause and prejudice, but who could demon-
strate actual innocence could nevertheless have his or her defaulted claims heard
on the merits.''
This means that a habeas court proceeding under the Murray v. Carrier actual
innocence exception does not relitigate the factual issue of the petitioner's guilt; it
considers the defaulted claims of constitutional error, which might result in a new
trial or outright release. If the writ is issued, it does so not from a determination of
176 See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995).
177 This is a controversial conclusion, and some academic commentators have criticized
the Court severely for reaching it. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on
the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 501, 502 (1996) ("[T]he judicial
system should not participate in the execution of innocent people. When a doctrine permits
a result so far removed from our collective sense of justice, it is time to re-examine that
doctrine."); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303, 378-79
(1993).
[Ilt is "scarcely logical" that an inmate who makes a sufficient showing
of innocence to overcome a procedural bar should remain in jail for life
because his constitutional claim ultimately proves unsuccessful. The
notion that a colorable showing of innocence is merely a "threshold"
for further review is plainly indefensible.
Id. at 378.
178 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
179 Generally speaking, "cause" means some external reason for the habeas petitioner's
failure to have raised the claim; and prejudice means some showing that the error complained
of had some substantial injurious impact on the jury's verdict. See, e.g., Tung Yin, A Better
Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 231-32
(1998).
180 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
S' Id. at 496.
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the petitioner's innocence, but rather from adjudication of legal claims that would
otherwise have been dismissed as procedurally defaulted.
For example, in the middle of the last century, the D.C. Circuit struggled with
the scope of cognizable habeas claims involving persons detained at mental
hospitals who claimed to have been restored to mental health. In De Marcos v.
Overholser,'82 the court held that habeas corpus was the appropriate vehicle for
challenging continued confinement in a mental facility and even suggested that the
court should determine the detainee's mental health. However, two years later, the
same court overruled itself in Dorsey v. Gill,'83 holding that "[h]abeas corpus is
available, not for the purpose of determining a petitioner's mental condition, but,
instead, as a method of initiating an appropriate procedure for that purpose.''14
Similarly, in the World War I selective service cases, Falbo v. United States'85 and
Estep v. United States,"8 6 the Court upheld a statutory scheme that required draft
inductees to challenge their induction classification before the local induction board;
Falbo failed to report for his assignment and when he was prosecuted, he was barred
from defending his failure to report by challenging his classification in a federal
court. Estep also challenged his classification status in front of the local board; after
losing his challenge, he reported for induction but refused to be inducted, after
which he too was convicted of failing to report and submit to induction. The Court
held that Estep was entitled to raise as a defense to prosecution the local board's
lack of jurisdiction:
If a local board ordered a member of Congress to report for
induction, or if it classified a registrant as available for military
service, because he was a Jew, or a German, or a Negro, it would
act in defiance of the law. ... In all such cases its action would
be lawless and beyond its jurisdiction." 7
This holding did not, however, give the federal courts the authority to relitigate the
factual issues inherent in the classification. 188
The ultimate statement of this principle is Herrera v. Collins,"9 in which the
Court denied relief to a death row inmate who presented a freestanding claim of
innocence as a ground for habeas relief. Herrera conceded that his double murder
i82 137 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
183 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
184 Id. at 864-65.
185 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
'86 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
187 Id. at 121.
1 8 id. at 122 ("The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations
are final even though they may be erroneous.").
189 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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trial had been free of error; however, his habeas petition presented "newly"
discovered evidence in the form of a deathbed confession by his brother that
purportedly proved his innocence.'90 In rejecting Herrera's petition, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that claims of innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been cognizable on habeas corpus review, because "federal habeas courts
sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution -
not to correct errors of fact."'' Applied to the Guantanamo detainees, Herrera
reinforces the conclusion that the availability of habeas corpus review does not mean
that federal courts will be deciding the underlying factual matters relating to
combatant status.
There are two reasons one might think that Herrera is inapplicable to the
Guantanamo detainees. First, Herrera involved a defendant who had been con-
victed of murder after an admittedly fair trial. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Kennedy, concurred in the majority opinion, but wrote separately to emphasize that
Herrera was a "legally guilty" person "who, refusing to accept the jury's verdict,
demands a hearing in which to have his culpability determined once again.' 92
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also placed significance on the fact that
Herrera had been convicted "after a full and fair trial."'93 The Guantanamo de-
tainees, on the other hand, have not been convicted of anything and are not "legally
guilty" in any sense.
Second, at least six Justices were willing to accept that the Constitution would
forbid the execution of a factually innocent person upon a truly persuasive
showing of innocence.' 94 From a vote-counting perspective, therefore, Herrera
190 Id. at 393.
' Id. at 400. But see Steiker, supra note 177, at 385-88 (arguing that federal habeas
jurisprudence does in fact recognize bare innocence claims where "state courts have refused
to entertain a claim... based on newly discovered evidence").
192 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., concurring).
194 See id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I cannot disagree with the fundamental
legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution."); id. at 429
(White, J., concurring) ("I assume that a persuasive showing of'actual innocence' made after
trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation
of newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in
this case."); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Nothing could be more contrary to
contemporary standards of decency or more shocking to the conscience than to execute a
person who is actually innocent.") (citations omitted); see also id. at 417.
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in
a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence"
made after trial would render the execution of a defendant uncon-
stitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state
avenue open to process such a claim.
Id.
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leaves open the possibility of an actual innocence claim - just not on Herrera's
pathetic showing.
But the first point - Herrera's fair trial as a basis for distinguishing Herrera
from the detainees' situation - is based on too restrictive a reading of Herrera. The
proposition of law that Herrera stands for (to the extent these concurrences should
be understood as part of the holding) is that when there is no dispute that a person
has received the process due to him or her under the circumstances, then the relevant
status of that person has been established, and the federal courts, on habeas review,
do not sit to revisit that status. With regard to criminal procedure, the process that
is due is set forth in the Bill of Rights,' 95 including the requirement that every
element of the crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 6 The Texas court that
convicted Herrera met its constitutional obligations by providing him with a trial
free from any constitutional error. In other words, the fact that Herrera was convict-
ed in a procedurally fair trial is relevant as establishing a standard the government
had to meet only because the Constitution required that those standards be met.
Because the Guantanamo detainees are not being imprisoned as convicted criminals,
they need not have been given a full-blown trial resulting in a judicial declaration
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to apply Herrera's reasoning. Rather, if we
assume that the detainees received the appropriate due process, whether through the
initial screening process described by Secretary Rumsfeld or through the formal
hearings ordered by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, 97 then Herrera
would apply because the detainees would have been determined to be combatants
through a procedurally fair process.
On the second point - the theoretical possibility of a showing of actual
innocence - no court since Herrera has recognized an instance of a freestanding
claim of innocence, and it seems unlikely that a Guantanamo detainee would be able
to meet the standard required to make such a showing. Justice White's concurrence
suggested that, at a minimum, a petitioner would have to show that no rational trier
of fact could have found him guilty.' That standard, derived from Jackson v.
Virginia,," governs sufficiency of evidence review in criminal appeals. Because the
government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases,200 a habeas petitioner arguably could have to meet an even higher standard to
prevail on an actual innocence claim in a setting where the government does not
have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is true because the
burden of proof distributes the risk of erroneous convictions and erroneous
195 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443-44 (1992).
196 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
197 See infra Part II.B.
198 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
199 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).
200 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358.
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acquittals: the higher the burden of proof, the less risk of erroneous conviction but
the greater risk of erroneous acquittal.2"' Even in a setting where society has
deemed an erroneous conviction far worse than an erroneous acquittal,2°2 a
petitioner seeking relief based on a freestanding claim of innocence has a high
threshold to meet before the Court will even consider hearing the claim. Assuming
that the government has some basis for concluding that the detainee was a
combatant, any evidence that the detainee could present to illustrate his non-
combatant status would tend only to contradict the government's evidence, in which
case it could hardly be said that no rational person could have concluded that the
government's classification was erroneous.
One other aspect of Herrera is worth considering. Herrera did not merely seek
to relitigate the issue of his innocence; rather, he wanted to have newly discovered
evidence of his innocence considered in a new forum.20 3 In rejecting Herrera's
argument that he was entitled to a new trial based on his showing of actual
innocence, the Court relied on the fact that the overwhelming majority of states did
have procedures for seeking new trials based on newly discovered evidence.2"
While some of those states, including Texas, imposed stringent time limits on such
motions,20 5 the Court was persuaded that the existence of such procedures - along
with the possibility of executive clemency - provided sufficient safeguards so as
not to offend "fundamental fairness.",206 Yet, the combatant status hearings more
than satisfy this reasoning. Because the hearings are to be held annually,
20 7
detainees will always have an opportunity to present newly discovered evidence of
their noncombatant status to the review board. Indeed, the detainees are in a more
favorable position than state court defendants in this regard because the state court
defendants must move successfully for a new trial, whereas the detainees get a new
hearing every year.
B. Due Process Claims
The most obvious claim for the detainees to raise on habeas review would be
that their continued detention violates their right to due process, as guaranteed by
201 See, e.g., Tung Yin, The Probative Values and Pitfalls of Drug Courier Profiles as
Probabilistic Evidence, 5 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 141, 163-64 (2000).
202 Hence, the aphorism that "[iut is better to let ten guilty persons go free than to convict
one innocent person." Id. at 164 (citation omitted).
203 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 396.
204 Id. at411 &n.1.
205 Texas, for example, required that such motions be brought within thirty days of
judgment. Id. at 400.
206 Id. at411.
207 See, e.g., No Day in Court for Some Detainees?, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2004, at A20.
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the Fifth Amendment.0 8 Such a claim would require the resolution of two issues:
whether the detainees have any due process rights, and if so, the substance of those
due process rights.
1. Do Nonresident Aliens Have Any Constitutional Rights?
One of the heavy questions that the Court avoided in Rasul was whether
nonresident aliens have any constitutional rights. The petitioners pushed this point
in their petitions for certiorari, framing the third question presented:
Does the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment permit
the United States to detain foreign nationals indefinitely, in
solitary confinement, without charges and without recourse to
any legal process, so long as they are held outside the "ultimate
sovereignty" of the United States, even when they are held in
territory over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction
and control? 0 9
208 Other potential claims to be raised include ones based on the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention], and on the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39151 (1984).
However, federal courts have consistently held that the Geneva Convention is not self-
executing because it relies upon diplomacy and international negotiation to resolve disputes
over its application. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003), overruled
on other grounds, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); see also Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629
(6th Cir. 1978) (holding that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War was not self-executing).
Similarly, courts have held that the Torture Convention is not self-executing. See David
P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law Within
the United States, 15 NOVA L. REV. 449, 467 (1991). The United States did enact a criminal
statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000), to give force to the Torture Convention; however,
that statute itself states that it is not to "be construed as creating any substantive or proce-
dural right enforceable by law by any party in any civil proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 2340B
(2000). Thus, under U.S. law, the Torture Convention is implemented as a criminal law.
Finally, to the extent that detainees want to litigate issues such as alleged torture or other
mistreatment, such claims are most likely cognizable not as habeas claims, but rather consti-
tutional torts under the Bivens doctrine. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). See generally Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the
Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1242 (1979).
209 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, Rasul (No. 03-334).
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In support of that question presented, the petitioners relied upon Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court,"' in which the Court had held that a foreign com-
pany with no minimum contacts to California could not be haled into a California
court to defend itself in a lawsuit brought by another foreign company involving
events outside the United States. T '
Ordinarily, in an exercise of judicial restraint, the Court will interpret an ambig-
uous statute to avoid a constitutional question if possible, at times to the point of
adopting an unnaturally strained reading of the statute.2 12 In this instance, however,
by interpreting the habeas statute to confer jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought
by the detainees, the Court has actually set up a constitutional question, because now
the court reviewing the habeas petition will have to determine whether nonresident
aliens have any due process rights before moving on to determine whether those
rights were violated.
The argument in favor of extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights is
summed up by Louis Henkin, who writes, "If constitutional provisions apply to
both aliens and citizens at home, why not to both aliens and citizens abroad?" '213
However, as a matter of doctrine, not all constitutional rights apply extrater-
ritorially, at least with regard to aliens. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquide,
21 4
the Court held that a Mexican national who had been tried in the United States
could not raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search of his home in Mexico
because the Fourth Amendment's protection of "the people" from unreasonable
searches and seizures did not apply to foreign nationals outside the country."s
The Court noted that the Constitution used the term "the people" at various
points, such as the Preamble and the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments - but not the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which use the terms
"person" or "accused"2"6 - suggesting that "the people" denotes, roughly speaking,
the American public.217
The best that can be said is that the Court has been unclear about whether the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution applies outside the United States. The
210 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
211 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24, Rasul (No. 03-334).
212 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 did not eliminatejudicial review via habeas corpus of deportation
matters despite an amendment entitled "Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus").
23 Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 24 (1985); see also Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
214 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
215 Id. at 274-75.
216 Id. at 266.
217 Id. at 265.
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Insular Cases,2 ' for example, stand for the proposition that only "fundamental"
constitutional rights, not every provision of the Constitution, applies to territory
acquired through conquest. Thus, unincorporated territories did not have to abide
by the requirements of trial by jury or indictment by a grand jury. Similarly,
Johnson v. Eisentrager,"9 while cited for the proposition that nonresident enemy
aliens have no Fifth Amendment rights outside the United States,22° actually can be
read more narrowly to state only that the trial rights secured by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments would not be extended in such circumstances because the aliens
have no legal vehicle to press such claims. 2 ' These cases need not foreclose the
possibility that the Due Process Clause applies outside the U.S. territorial limits.
2 2
The distinction between "rights" and "limitations" may aid in understanding
Eisentrager and the Insular Cases on the one hand, and Rasul on the other, with
respect to the Due Process Clause. The Framers thought that no Bill of Rights was
necessary because the Constitution established a national government of limited
powers.223 But what the Bill of Rights has established are judicially enforceable
rights for those who can claim them. Thus, the "people" (meaning, as Verdugo-
Urquidez suggests, the American community, a group broader than citizens) can
enforce the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by pointing to
the Fourth Amendment, even though, if Alexander Hamilton and company were
right, no such amendment was necessary to keep the federal government from
having the power to conduct searches or seizures at any time.224
But sometimes the government is still bound by limitations despite the ab-
sence of anyone to enforce that limitation. For example, the Constitution requires
21 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
219 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
220 See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269.
221 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 782-83 (1950). Similarly, in In re Ross, 140
U.S. 453 (1891), the Court upheld a so-called "consular trial" of an American citizen for
murdering a ship's officer while in Japanese waters. The Court held that the "Constitution
can have no operation in another country." Id.
222 Cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) ("None of this is to say that Congress
is free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs. In that area,
as any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause."); Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) ("The [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause ... was found.. . as
a limitation upon the executive, legislative and judicial powers of the Federal Government.");
see also Ronald Dworkin, What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 12, 2004,
available at http://www.nybook.com/article/17293 ("The historical core of due process, and
its most fundamental point, is the right of individuals not to be arbitrarily and indefinitely
imprisoned; if noncitizens across the world have any due process protection against our
government at all, they have that right.").
223 THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
224 Id. at 513-14 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Congress to publish "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money." '225 Yet, in United States v. Richardson,226 the
Court held that a federal taxpayer had no standing to litigate the CIA's failure to
provide a public accounting; and indeed, the opinion strongly suggests that no one
would have standing to bring such a claim.227 Of course, there are some significant
differences between a lack of statutory jurisdiction (the situation in Eisentrager) and
a lack of standing (the basis for Richardson); however, the key similarity is that in
both situations, there is an arguable obligation on the part of the government that is
not subject to judicial enforcement.
As another example, suppose that the President ordered the military to launch
an unprovoked nuclear strike against France. Does the President have the consti-
tutional authority to attack an allied nation without a congressional declaration of
war?228 If the answer is that he does not, is that because the citizens and the
government of France have a "right" not to be attacked absent a congressional
declaration of war?
229
225 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
226 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
227 See id. at 178-80.
228 The exact nature of the President's unilateral war-making power is somewhat murky,
with some scholars such as John Yoo arguing that the Framers intended for the President to
take the initiative, checked by Congress through the twin powers of funding and impeach-
ment, see, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996), while others take the more
conventional view that, subject to the very narrow exception of repelling an actual attack, see
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), the President must wait for Congress to
authorize war, see, e.g., Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 11 (1995) ("The authority
to initiate war lay with Congress. The President could act unilaterally only in one area: to
repel sudden attacks."). Of course, the President might be able to offer some rationale
triggering the "repel doctrine" - perhaps the President believes that a group of anti-
American military officers are about to stage a coup, with plans to use nuclear weapons
against the United States. But such rationale is sufficiently far-fetched that we need not tarry
with it here.
229 Cf Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 307
n.** (2d ed. 1996) ("Surely, someone in Vietnam, in Panama, or in the Persian Gulf could
not object that the President of the United States had no constitutional authority to wage war
there."). Incidentally, this rights/limitations distinction also demonstrates the flaw in the
detainees' reliance on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), to
support their claim for due process rights. Although the Court spoke in that case of due
process rights, the underlying theory of personal jurisdiction upon which Asahi Metal relies
is that all courts (federal and state) have inherent limitations placed upon them by the Due
Process Clause. We need not conclude that Asahi Metal had any constitutional rights to
decide that California state courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it because
"[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to
exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant." Id at 108. The difference between
Asahi Metal and the nuclear strike on France hypothetical is that in the former, the Court was
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We can call these "rights" that cannot be enforced, or we can call them "limita-
tions on government," but once we say that "rights" and "limitations on government"
are, in some sense, opposite sides of the same coin - but with one important
difference having to do with judicial enforceability - then Rasul's impact becomes
clear. Absent access to the federal courts, the question of what due process is owed
is committed functionally to the President. By interpreting the habeas statute as
covering claims by the Guantanamo detainees, Rasul, in effect, extends to such
aliens the right to litigate the scope of that limitation in court.
2. What Kind of Process Is Due?
Assuming that nonresident aliens such as the Guantanamo detainees are entitled
to some due process, the question that will be presented on a habeas petition alleging
detention in violation of the Fifth Amendment is whether the petitioner received the
process he was due.
In this context, due process refers to the "constraints on governmental decisions
which deprive individuals of 'liberty' . . . interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth ... Amendment.."230 The constraints consist of procedures
that the government must follow, generally before taking the action, and include
"the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '-231
A detainee claiming that his or her detention violates due process will have to
show that he or she was deprived of his or her liberty by being classified as an
enemy combatant, and hence detained, without adequate due process. But due
process is a flexible concept that is highly context-dependent.232 Under Mathews
v. Eldridge,233 in assessing whether a claimant has been deprived of due process
being asked to take some action against nonresident aliens that it lacked the power to do,
whereas in the latter, the Court is being asked to prevent another branch of government from
taking some action that the other branch lacks the power to take. Nonresident aliens may lack
"minimum contacts" with this country, which is why they cannot be haled into court, but it
may also be why they may not have freestanding constitutional rights even though the Due
Process Clause limits government power.
230 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). A detainee might also raise a sub-
stantive due process claim, but such a claim is unlikely to succeed separate from a
procedural due process claim. To prevail, a detainee would have to show that his detention
as an enemy combatant "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952). Because wartime detention of enemy combatants is an accepted practice of war, see,
e.g., Geneva Convention, supra note 208, it is difficult to see how such detention can shock
the conscience.
231 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
232 See id. at 348; see also Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
320-21 (1985); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
233 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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based on the failure to use a particular procedure, the Court applies a balancing test,
weighing three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.2M
Essentially, Eldridge calls for a utilitarian assessment of the efficacy of additional
procedures weighed against the cost of those procedures, all in the context of the
interest at stake.235 Thus, in Eldridge, the Court held that due process did not entitle
a disability benefits recipient to an evidentiary hearing before the termination of
those benefits. The cost of an erroneous deprivation was likely to be significant,
though less so than the termination of welfare payments,236 for which the Court had
previously held that evidentiary hearings were required.237 With the disability
benefits, however, the Court concluded that pre-termination evidentiary hearings
would be of limited value because the bulk of the cases would be decided on
"routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports" for which an evidentiary hearing
would typically be unnecessary.3  Finally, the burden on the government of having
to hold pre-termination hearings would be considerable because disability benefit
recipients would have the incentive to demand such hearings, thereby continuing to
draw their full benefits.239
Applying the Eldridge test here, the first factor- the private interest involved -
obviously weighs strongly in favor of the detainees, as it is their personal liberty at
stake.2' The second and third factors depend on the particular procedures used and
'3 Id. at 335.
... Jerry Mashaw has criticized this focus on cost-benefit analysis as ignoring other
values, such as human dignity, that are also vindicated by providing appropriate due process.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
236 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 341.
237 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
238 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,404 (1971)).
239 Id. at 347. The Court, however, made clear that fiscal cost was not the only kind of
burden to be considered. Id. at 348.
240 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974). It may seem somewhat
incongruous to use a test devised in a disability benefits case in this vastly different context
of wartime detention. However, since Eldridge, the Court has consistently emphasized that
due process is flexible and has used the Eldridge test. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501
U.S. 1, 2 (1991); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 36 (1991).
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those to be considered to replace or supplement the actual procedures. The
methodology I will use is to consider the various elements of a fair hearing, as
outlined by Judge Friendly: (1) lack of bias by the judging party, (2) notice, (3)
opportunity to challenge, (4) right to present witnesses, (5) right to confront the
evidence, (6) right to have the decision based only on the evidence presented, (7)
counsel, (8) making of a record, (9) statement of reasons behind the ultimate
decision, (10) public attendance, and (11) judicial review.2 4 ' To be clear, Judge
Friendly did not assert that every element needed to be provided in every hearing;
to the contrary, he suggested "that the elements of a fair hearing should not be
considered separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally
demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing or
even eliminating another.
' 24 2
a. Initial detention and classification in Afghanistan
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the complete lack of guidance given by
Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Rasul is whether the federal courts would have
to entertain habeas petitions filed on behalf of prisoners shortly after their capture
that argue that they were entitled to some form of due process prior to being
captured. Of course, the actual likelihood of such immediate filings is exceedingly
low, due in part to the fog of war and the difficulty of obtaining real-time
information about the results of military encounters. Still, Rasul leaves open the
theoretical possibility of Article 1I courts being called upon to dictate procedures
that must be followed before persons suspected of being enemy combatants can be
detained, and the absence of a satisfactory answer may reveal an analytic flaw in
Rasul, even though the flaw is unlikely to be exploited.
As it turns out, modem administrative law comes to the rescue. The Court has
consistently upheld the ability of federal agencies to act first and hold hearings later
in a variety of situations where an emergency threatens public safety.243 Thus, the
Secretary of the Interior was able to issue an immediate cessation order to mining
companies before holding a hearing, where continued mining posed a risk of a
mining disaster that threatened public safety.2" The local department of motor
vehicles was able to revoke drivers' licenses before holding a hearing, where the
drivers posed risks to society.2 45 School officials, who ordinarily must provide
students facing discipline with notice of charges and an opportunity to explain, were
:"' Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing ", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-95 (1975).
242 Id. at 1279.
243 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,299-300
(1981) ("The Court has often acknowledged, however, that summary administrative action
may be justified in emergency situations.").
244 Id. at 300-01.
245 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977).
1097
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1035
nevertheless able to immediately remove, without notice or hearing, "[s]tudents
whose presence pose[d] a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing
threat of disrupting the academic process." 2"
While many of these situations predate the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test24 7
and appear to consider only the potential harm to the public in delaying action to
address the perceived emergency, they are in fact consistent with Eldridge. The
essence of Eldridge is that because due process is flexible, the circumstances dictate
the timing and substance of hearings. The emergency cases represent determin-
ations that, under the circumstances, no pre-deprivation hearing is necessary.
Notice, however, that the Court has construed "emergency" and "public safety"
generously. An order directing a gasoline station to abate the nuisance of gas fumes
spewing from a leaky gas storage tank presented a clear instance of government
action to protect a large segment of the public from some imminent harm, such as
a gas explosion. 241 Other instances are less clear. For example, in an oft-criticized
decision, the Court held that emergency situations include the "need of the govern-
ment promptly to secure its revenues," thus justifying summary action to collect tax
payments.249 A bank president indicted, but. not yet convicted, for making false
statements also could be suspended from running the FDIC-insured bank because
Congress had determined that "prompt suspension of indicted bank officers may be
necessary to protect the interests of depositors and to maintain public confidence in
our banking institutions. 25 ° The Court has even stated (with all apparent serious-
ness) that a racing horse that tested positive for an illegal drug posed such a grave
threat to public safety as to warrant emergency suspension of the horse trainer.25 '
Given such precedents, there should be little doubt that a battlefield situation
constitutes an emergency situation that warrants the loss of liberty inherent in
capture without resort to a prior hearing. The pervasive threat of violence has often
justified the delaying or deferring of due process to such time when the threat no
longer exists, even when the population in danger is relatively discrete and confined,
246 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975); see also Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselbery,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (upholding pre-hearing seizure of misbranded supplements);
Adams v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913) (upholding pre-hearing interdiction of
milk obtained not in conformity with ordinance requiring tuberculin testing); N. Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (upholding pre-hearing seizure of
contaminated food).
247 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
248 See City of Newburgh v. Park Filling Station, Inc., 82 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1948).
249 Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931); see also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 n.18 (1977) (reaffirming Phillips because "the very existence of
government depends upon the prompt collection of the revenues").
250 FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988).
251' Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1979).
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such as prison inmates. 2 The danger posed to American soldiers on an active
battlefield should fit comfortably within the emergency exception to pre-detention
due process." 3
However, the emergency situation cases do require that a hearing be given as
soon as practical after the emergency action has been taken,254 and therefore, at
some point after being taken off the battlefield, the detainees would be entitled to
some due process (and it may be a two- or three-stage process). Let us consider
the procedures used to classify them at that initial stage. According to Secretary
Rumsfeld, approximately 10,000 prisoners were initially detained in Afghanistan.255
Only ten percent were brought to Guantanamo Bay,256 based preliminarily on indi-
vidual interviews conducted "by a team of people, three or four or five people -
sometimes Department of Justice, sometimes Army, mixture of Army, sometimes
CIA, sometimes whatever."25 7 In some cases, "when doubt [was] raised about [a
detainee's status] - a process then [was] a more elaborate one," involving
additional interviews.258
As far as due process goes, there was not very much. The detainees selected to
be sent to Guantanamo Bay had no legal counsel, no apparent right to contest the
evidence against them, and no apparent right to call witnesses or present evidence.
The persons making the decision to send an individual to Guantanamo Bay may
have been involved in the capture itself.259 Yet, in the context of the circumstances,
this process might have been adequate. The Court has upheld minimal, preliminary
252 See LaBatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1975) (upholding emergency
segregation of prisoners to preserve the safety and integrity of the institution); Hodges v.
Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (D.N.J. 1976) (upholding emergency segregation of prison
inmates during tense confrontation), affd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1125-26 (D. Haw. 1976) (upholding, in part, emergency
detention of mentally ill persons prone to violence).
253 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (holding the fact of war itself has
justified pre-hearing seizures of property "to meet the needs of a national war effort")
(citations omitted).
254 See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977).
255 See Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks to Miami Chamber of Commerce, CNN
Transcripts, at http://premium.asia.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0402/13/se.02.htm (Feb. 13,
2004).
256 Id.
257 See Transcript of Rumsfeld, Myers Pentagon Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense,
at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0208dod.htm (Feb. 8, 2002)
[hereinafter Rumsfeld Pentagon Briefing]; see also Ruth Wedgwood, War Comes to Court,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20,2004, at A20 (op-ed noting that these decisions occurred following "an
intricate multilevel review process involving lawyers, intelligence officers and field
commanders").
25. Rumsfeld Pentagon Briefing, supra note 257.
259 Prior participation in the subject matter of the hearing can constitute bias. See Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 & n.21 (1974); id. at 196 (White, J., dissenting).
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procedures that were followed by subsequent, more rigorous procedures;2' 6 thus,
the due process claim will turn on the procedures used to justify the continuing
detention.
b. Continuing detention
For those detained at Camps X-Ray and Delta, more than two years passed
before the government announced additional procedures for further evaluating their
combatant status. Prior to the Court's decision in Rasul,26' Secretary Rumsfeld
announced plans for a review process, to take place at least annually, through which
Guantanamo detainees could seek release from Camp Delta.262 The hearings would
not take place in the federal courts, but rather would be conducted by a board
comprised of military officers, with the final decision to be made by the Naval
Secretary.263 On July 7, 2004, a little more than a week after the Court issued its
decision in Rasul, the Defense Department issued an order that established the
hearings. 2 The key provisions include (a) the provision of an assigned military
officer as "personal representative for the purpose of assisting the detainee in
connection with the review process";265 (b) "three neutral commissioned officers"
as the tribunal; 266 (c) the right to call "reasonably available" witnesses;2 67 (d) the
inapplicability of the rules of evidence; 26s and (e) the right to testify and the right not
to be forced to testify.269 If the tribunal determines that a detainee should not be
classified an enemy combatant, the tribunal will prepare a written report to be sent
to the Secretary of Defense, who will coordinate the detainee's release with the
Secretary of State.270
How do these hearings measure up against Judge Friendly's list, and would they
pass muster under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test? To begin with, the
hearings clearly satisfy the elements of opportunity to present reasons against the
260 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
540 (1971).
261 Also prior to oral argument in Rasul, which took place on April 20, 2004.
262 See Jess Bravin, U.S. To Unveil Review System for Guantanamo Detainees, WALL. ST.
J., June 21, 2004, at B1.
263 Id.
264 See Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, Memorandum for the
Secretary of the Navy, July 7, 2004 (on file with author) [hereinafter Tribunal Order].
265 Id. at para. c.
266 Id. at para. e.
267 Id. at para. g(8). The Tribunal Order provides that witnesses who are U.S. military
personnel will be deemed not reasonably available if their commanders determine that "their
presence at a hearing would affect combat or support operations"; written statements may
be used in such circumstances. Id.
268 Id. at para. g(9).
269 Id. at para. g(10), (11).
270 Id. at para. i.
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classification (#3),271 right to have a decision based on the evidence (#6), the making
of a record (#8),172 the statement of reasons (#9),273 and judicial review (#1 1).274
That leaves five major elements to examine. Even though conventional wisdom is
that the government suffered a major defeat in Rasul, the Court's past due process
cases suggest that these hearings may well pass constitutional muster.
Unbiased tribunal (#1): The most important concern one might have about the
hearing boards is whether the board members will be biased against the detainees.
A biased decision maker violates due process.275 Bias can take the form of a
personal interest (financial or otherwise) in the matter,276 personal bias and
prejudice,277 or prior involvement in the matter.278 Because the order establishing
the hearing boards specifies that the decision makers are to be "neutral commis-
sioned officers" who were not involved in the capture of the detainee, interrogation,
or initial decision to classify the detainee as a combatant, there is no issue of prior
involvement in the matter.279
Because the order specifies that the board members are to be "neutral," the due
process question of bias should be answered, at least facially. The Court has at
various times used "neutral" to describe decision makers in a way that suggests it
to be synonymous with "unbiased" or "impartial.""28 If the order is followed, there
271 Id. at para. g(10).
272 Id. at para. g(3).
273 Id. at para. b.
274 The Defense Department order specifically directs the military to inform the detainees
of the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at para. b.
275 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
276 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1955) ("[N]o man can be a judge in his own
case."); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (finding a violation of due process where a
mayor shared in traffic fines issued by mayor's court); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000)
(requiring federal judges to disqualify themselves where they or close relatives have a
financial or other interest "that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding").
277 See, e.g., United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d 1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that remarks by judge that Colombians "only killed 32 Chief Judges in that nation.
Their regard for the judicial system, the men who run their laws, I'm glad I'm in America"
demonstrated extrajudicial bias); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2000).
278 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)-(3) (2000).
279 Tribunal Order, supra note 266 and accompanying text.
280 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that American
citizen detained as enemy combatant had to have "a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker"); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 549 (2003) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987), for the
proposition that pre-trial detention without bail required a hearing before a "neutral
decisionmaker"); Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,775 (2002)
(describing maritime agency hearing process as "involv[ing] a neutral decisionmaker");
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559,572 (1999) (equating "neutral decisionmaker" with one who
has no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the matter) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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will be no due process concern about the impartiality of the decision makers. If a
detainee could show that a board member was biased, the detainee would be entitled
on habeas to challenge the board decision on the ground that the board violated the
terms of the order.28 Of course, if the government interprets "neutral" in some way
other than "unbiased" or "impartial," then the hearing boards would almost certainly
fail to provide due process.
28 2
Thus, the due process problem relating to potential bias is practical. In the event
that a board member had a bias, would the detainee be in a position to discover this
bias and to acquire evidence to prove it? Comparison to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice is instructive. Prosecution of military personnel for violations of the
Uniform Code takes place in courts-martial in front of military judges who do not
have life tenure. These military judges are themselves soldiers who are accountable
to superior officers.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice strictly prohibits unlawful command
influence: "No person subject to [the Uniform Code of Military Justice] may attempt
to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or
any other military tribunal or any member thereof." '283 This prohibition, however,
is functionally equivalent to the Tribunal Order's declaration that the hearing
board shall be comprised of "neutral" officers. There is no mechanism for ensuring
that the prohibition will be observed and, in fact, the reported cases of unlawful
command influence tend to be instances where high ranking officers made public
statements.284
Thus, from a practical perspective, one significant concern in military
proceedings will be the degree of insulation that the hearing board officers have
from command pressure.285 For example, in Patton v. Yount,286 Justices Stevens and
Brennan argued, in dissent, that due process required an "independent review in a
case that arouses the passions of the local community in which an elected judge is
required to preside. Unlike an appointed federal judge with life tenure, an elected
judge has reason to be concerned about the community's reaction to his disposition
of highly publicized cases." '287 While military officers need not worry about re-
281 Cf. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120-21 (1946) (allowing such a challenge to
an administrative determination in a subsequent criminal prosecution).
212 See William G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the
Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 617 (1971) ("The ultimate question raised
by either a bias or an interest challenge is whether the adjudicating official or tribunal will
(or did) reach a decision free of improper influences and on the basis of the facts presented
and arguments made at the hearing.").
283 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2000).
284 See, e.g., United States v. Zagar, 18 C.M.R. 34, 40 (C.M.A. 1955).
285 See United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986) ("Command influence
is the mortal enemy of military justice.").
286 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
287 Id. at 1052-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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election, they may labor under command pressure, either direct or indirect: will the
officers feel capable of declaring a particular detainee to be a noncombatant if they
feel that is the proper classification?
What alternative would improve the accuracy of the fact-finding process by
reducing the likelihood of such hidden bias, yet not unduly burden the government's
interest? The concern here is not with the facial neutrality of the board members,
for that is provided for by the order, but rather the practical ability to determine
whether the order has been met with compliance. One alternative is to have decision
makers with fixed terms of office (or even life tenure), though in Weiss v. United
States,2"' the Court rejected a due process challenge to the composition of courts-
martial. The Court concluded that, despite a lack of even fixed terms, "the applic-
able provisions of the [Uniform Code of Military Justice], and corresponding
regulations, by insulating military judges from the effects of command influence,
sufficiently preserve judicial impartiality so as to satisfy the Due Process Clause. 289
In particular, the military judges are overseen by the Judge Advocates General,
"who have no interest in the outcome of a particular court-martial," and there are
rules against unlawful command influence.29 Moreover, from a normative perspec-
tive, such an alternative would be grossly inflexible because the government might
not need the services of the board members for the entire fixed term of office.29 If
the term of office were kept short to alleviate the inflexibility problem, it would not
address the concern of undue influence because then the administration would be
able to replace quickly those decision makers with whose decisions it disagreed.
A second alternative procedure would be to have the hearings chaired by
civilians, not military personnel, on the theory that civilians would be less subject
to influence and pressure.292 The general argument against having civilian judges
in military proceedings is that non-military personnel will generally be unfamiliar
"with 'extremely technical provisions of the Uniform Code [of Military Justice]
288 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
289 Id. at 179.
290 Id. at 180 (citing Articles 26 and 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 826, 827 (2000)).
291 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 118 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that Congress could constitutionally create non-
Article III bankruptcy courts because "Congress may have desired to maintain some
flexibility in its possible future responses to the general problem of bankruptcy. There is no
question that the existence of several hundred bankruptcy judges with life tenure would have
severely limited Congress' future options." Id.
292 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1956) ("Conceding to military personnel that high
degree of honesty and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, the
members of a court-martial . . . do not and cannot have the independence of. . . civilian
judges.").
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which have no analogs in civilian jurisprudence.' 29 3 While the hearings involve
neither substantive charges nor procedures set forth in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, they do involve questions for which an expertise in combat is required. 4
Whether a particular person is a combatant based upon a given set of facts is
something that military personnel are trained to determine during the heat of
combat. This is not to say that civilians could not be trained to make the same
determinations, but military personnel enjoy a decided advantage.
Notice (#2) and Knowing the Evidence Against Oneself (#5): These two
elements are naturally considered together. Adequate notice of the charges - in
this instance, the classification as an enemy combatant - along with the evidence
against the detainee will enable the detainee to assert a meaningful defense.
The Tribunal Order states that the detainee will be provided advance "notice
of the unclassified factual basis for the detainee's designation as an enemy
combatant."29 In other words, the detainee will be provided with a summary of the
evidence against him, rather than the evidence itself. Moreover, the summary will
not refer to any classified information. While the detainee's personal representative
will have access to relevant classified material, the personal representative cannot
share that information with the detainee."l
Here we can see some areas in which the Tribunal Order could be clarified, and
other areas in which the order is problematic. First, how far in advance of the hear-
ing is the notice and summary of evidence provided? Whether the amount of
advance notice is reasonable may end up depending on the individual circumstances
of a detainee's case. If a detainee opts not to participate in the hearing, then even
a day or two of advance notice should suffice. If, on the other hand, a detainee in-
tends to present evidence, including witnesses who must be brought to Guantanamo
Bay, a day or two of advance notice may be insufficient, especially if it will take
longer than that to procure the witnesses.
Second, in any detainee's case where the combatant determination rests in part
on classified information, the detainee naturally will be disadvantaged in presenting
293 Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 51 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Noyd v.
Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 696 (1969)). A second concern identified in Parisi was "the effect of
judicial intervention on morale and military discipline." Id. However, that concern focused
on the effect of review of courts-martial by civilian courts, not the use of civilian judges.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (formerly the Court of Military Appeals),
which hears some appeals of courts-martial, consists entirely of civilians appointed by the
President. 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(1) (2000).
294 Cf. infra notes 336-42 (discussing how the personal representative assigned to each
detainee can offset the absence of counsel due to the assumption that military officers will
be conversant with the subject of combatant status).
295 Tribunal Order, supra note 264, at para. g(l).
296 Id. at para. c.
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his case for not being a combatant.297 The general right to know the evidence
against oneself and to refute that evidence is a staple of due process, even where
there are national security secrets at stake. In federal criminal cases, for example,
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) sets forth procedures for
protecting classified material in cases where classified material might be relevant
and probative to the defendant's case.298 Specifically, depending on the nature of
the classified material, a court can order that the United States be allowed to substi-
tute "a summary of the specific classified information." '  Classified information
may be classified not just because of the material's substance, but also the means by
which the information was gathered,"° which might provide a reason for keeping
even a summary of the classified information from the detainee. However, at least
in civilian cases, the balance struck allows defendants some access to classified
information (or substitutions) upon a showing that it "is at least 'helpful to the
defense of [the] accused."' 30 1
A detainee might well be entitled to some kind of procedure analogous to CIPA.
Whereas criminal defendants litigating CIPA issues are sometimes hampered by
having to show that the classified material would be "helpful" without knowing
what is in the classified material, here the government is already willing to allow the
detainee's personal representative access to relevant classified material. Thus, the
value to the detainee of knowing at least a summary of classified material, where
that material is relevant to his classification as a combatant, probably significantly
outweighs the incremental burden to the government of providing a detainee with
that summary.
CIPA is not, however, free of controversy. The substitution provision, in
particular, has been criticized for "chang[ing] admissible evidence into a different
form, without consent of the defendant, for reasons unrelated to criminal justice
concerns. 3. 2 Because CIPA allows the government, in certain circumstances, to
seek approval of substitutions ex parte, courts are put in the position of either
deferring to the government's assessment of the adequacy of the substitution or
297 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Nos. CIV.A. 02-VC-0299 CKK et al., 2005 WL
195356 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2005) (holding that combatant status review hearings failed to
provide due process by not providing access to classified information to detainees).
298 Pub. L. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§
1-16 (2000)).
299 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6(c)(1)(B) (2000).
'00 See United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[Tlhe government's
security interest in the conversation lies not so much in the contents of the conversations, as
in the time, place, and nature of the government's ability to intercept the conversations at
all.").
301 Id. (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)).
302 Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act,
13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 306 (1985).
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having to determine for themselves the adequacy without necessarily being as well
informed about the issues as the parties.0 3 While those concerns would also be
present if the combatant hearings were to include a CIPA-like provision to give the
detainee a summary of classified material, the detainee would obviously be better
off with the summary of the evidence than with nothing.
It is important to keep in mind that this assessment of the adequacy of the notice
given and of the basis for the combatant classification is dependent on current facts.
The government's interest in protecting secret intelligence sources and methods
remains regardless of how many detainees there are to process, but the proposed
CIPA-like provision could become significantly more burdensome as the number
of prisoners increases. One can imagine that if there were 500,000 detainees
challenging their combatant classification, the government might be hard-pressed
to prepare a summary for each detainee, especially if the summaries required
individual tailoring. In those circumstances, due process might well not require that
the government provide any summaries, including summaries of unclassified
information. Where, as here, there are fewer than 600 detainees, however, not
providing such summaries is difficult to justify.
To call witnesses (#4): The detainees have the right to call witnesses, but that
fight is circumscribed by the requirement that the witnesses be "reasonably
available," 3" with military commanders as the final arbiters of reasonable
availability in the case of witnesses who are members of the armed forces. 30 5 Where
witnesses are not available, written statements can be used in lieu of live
testimony."' Thus, the question is whether the use of written statements rather than
live witnesses violates due process.
Having witnesses appear before the hearing would unquestionably lead to more
accurate results than reliance upon written statements. This is one reason appellate
courts defer to factual findings based on credibility determinations; as the Court
noted, "[f]ace to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a
position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. ''30 7 Where a
tribunal must rely upon a written statement, it is unable to assess the witness's
303 Id. at 314-15.
3 See supra note 267.
305 Of course, the Sixth Amendment guarantees various rights related to witnesses, notably
compulsory process and confrontation, but those guarantees apply only in criminal trials. The
Guantanamo detainees are being held not pursuant to criminal charges, but to the President's
Commander-in-Chief power as battlefield captures.
306 See, e.g., Particia M. Wald, Note From the Field: Dealing with Witnesses in War
Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE H.R. & DEv. L.J. 217, 227
(2002).
307 United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952) (quoting Boyd v.
Boyd, 169 N.E. 632, 634 (N.Y. 1930)).
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demeanor and credibility.3 °8 Yet, problematically, credibility may be an issue in the
detainee hearings. Consider former detainee Shafiq Rasul. Had he not been re-
leased, and instead had his case been heard by the hearing board, he presumably
would have testified (as alleged in the petitioners' brief) that he was abducted by the
Northern Alliance while in Pakistan to visit his aunt, explore his culture, and contin-
ue his computer studies.3 09 The U.S. government would have presented evidence (in
person or written) that Rasul was a member of either Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
Perhaps this factual dispute could be resolved based solely on Rasul's credibility.3 1
But surely the result of the proceeding would be more accurate with live witnesses
who could be cross-examined; written statements cannot be cross-examined. In
some circumstances, the Court has held that where an agency "decision[] turn[s] on
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses. ' 1 ' Yet, other courts, such as the United States Claims Court in
Peters v. United States,"2 have concluded that hearsay evidence, though not tested
by cross-examination, nevertheless can be relied upon in agency hearings "so long
as the evidence upon which the decision is ultimately based is substantial and has
probative value. '313 Thus, the court upheld an agency's termination of a military
supply clerk for bribery despite the fact that crucial evidence of bribery consisted
of affidavits by four of the persons who had allegedly offered bribes. The court
noted that the affidavits were signed and were against the interests of the affiants,
and that the affiants had no motive to accuse Peters.31 4
On the other hand, the burden on the government, requiring live witnesses, can
be significant. Some members of the armed forces involved in the capture of
detainees may have been killed in action, either in Afghanistan or Iraq.31 5 Others
may still be overseas fighting the war on terrorism. To force the government to call
such soldiers away from military duty would, as Justice Jackson put it, harm morale
308 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 198 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (noting that factual findings by
district judges are entitled to deference even when not based on credibility determinations,
but even greater deference when they are based on credibility determinations).
9 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1137 (2003).
310 Note that such an approach would essentially force the detainee to testify, in
contravention of the Order.
... Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); see also Brock v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 276 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting "the critical role that cross-
examination plays in accurate factfinding").
312 408 F.2d 719 (Cl. Ct. 1969).
313 See id. at 722 (quoting Morelli v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 848, 853-54 (1966)); cf.
FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(2), (b)(3) (allowing hearsay in instances where the witness is "unavail-
able" and has made a statement "under belief of impending death" or "against interest").
114 Peters, 408 F.2d at 724.
311 Cf. FED. R. EvrD. 804(a)(4) (defining declarant as unavailable if dead for purposes of
hearsay exceptions).
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by "allow[ing] the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him
to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the
military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. ' 316 The administrative
burden on the government of arranging transportation for the active-duty soldiers
while either suffering a loss of combat strength overseas or having to arrange for
temporary replacements is also significant.3 17 Where the military witness is not on
active duty, however, the burden on the government is reduced largely to transport-
ing the witness to Guantanamo Bay and other associated costs, and probably would
swing the balance in favor of the detainee.
From a normative perspective, allowing the battlefield commanders to determine
if military personnel are reasonably available is consistent with the general
deference afforded the executive branch in national security matters. Deference
need not mean complete abdication. If, for example, there was a suspicion that the
military was keeping a particular witness overseas purposely, so as to shield him
from cross-examination, a habeas court should hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine for itself whether the witness's unavailability is due to the government's
bad faith.31
Counsel (#7): Under the Order, each detainee will be provided a military officer
as a "personal representative" for assistance. The order does not state whether the
officer will be a lawyer, but there are reports that the officer will not be.319 The due
process issue here is whether the detainee should be allowed to be represented by
an attorney at either his own cost or the attorney's expense (i.e., pro bono repre-
sentation). Note that we are not talking about the appointment of counsel at
government expense; the only situation in which the Court has held that the
government must provide counsel to an indigent person is when the government
prosecutes the individual for criminal violations.320
316 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950); see also Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
2686, 2707 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting same passage).
317 Note that the detainee's inability to call a witness deemed not "reasonably available"
is mitigated by the fact that the combatant status hearings are to be convened every year.
Thus, if a given military witness is not available the first year the detainee has his hearing,
the witness may be available the next year. Of course, that year of detention is quite signif-
icant to the particular detainee, so it would be preferable to delay a particular detainee's
annual hearing if a military witness is known to be coming off active duty in the near future.
318 Cf Buie v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring a showing of bad
faith on the part of the prosecution in influencing defense witnesses to justify habeas relief);
United States ex rel. Banks v. McGinnis, 563 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1194 (1985) (suggesting that bad faith concealment of witness by the prosecution
could be a constitutional violation).
319 See, e.g., Janice Tibbetts, U.S. Treatment of Khadr "Illegal, " Lawyer Argues, NAT'L
POST, July 9, 2004, at All.
320 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1963) (state cases); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (federal cases); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270
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In Powell v. Alabama,321 the Court stated that "[tihe right to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. 322 Powell was a death penalty case, reinforced by the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, but in Goldberg v. Kelly,323 the Court cited Powell to hold that a
person facing the loss of welfare was constitutionally entitled to have counsel
present at the pre-deprivation hearing.324
There is little doubt that an attorney, trained as an advocate, would prove
useful in helping a detainee make the case that he is not an enemy combatant. For
example, if the detainee opts to testify, a lawyer would be able to guide the
detainee through direct examination to present his story clearly and concisely.325
And a lawyer will be better able to cross-examine military witnesses and to
challenge the government's presentation of evidence. Perhaps most importantly, a
lawyer advocates for the client. The value of having an advocate who is familiar
with the system and who is on your side cannot be overestimated.
Yet, it is also clear that counsel is not always constitutionally required, even
where the individual interest at stake is the loss of liberty. For example, in Wolff v.
McDonnell,326 the Court held that prison inmates facing disciplinary proceedings
were not entitled to legal counsel at the hearing.327 The reasoning in that case,
however, is not entirely on point, as the Court was concerned that allowing counsel
into such proceedings "would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast
and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further correctional goals. '3 2 In
addition, Wolff was decided at a time when rehabilitation was still considered a
viable correctional goal. Legal counsel might have retarded that goal by inhibiting
the truth-seeking process if doing so would be in the client's interest,329 and thus the
Court concluded that, for a non-adversarial process such as the disciplinary
proceeding, counsel was not necessary.33 °
(1970) (declining to hold that welfare recipients were entitled to appointed counsel in welfare
benefits termination hearings).
321 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
322 Id. at 68-69.
32' 397 U.S. 254.
324 Id. at 270.
321 See JAMES W. MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY'S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 343-45 (3d ed. 1994)
(discussing the challenges of preparing proper organization, pacing, and flow of direct
examination).
326 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
327 Id. at 570.
328 id.
329 See Friendly, supra note 241, at 1288.
330 See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (refusing, over Justice
Brennan's dissent, to reach the issue of whether a parolee facing parole revocation hearing
was entitled to have the assistance of counsel).
1109
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1035
One crucial factor in determining the necessity, as opposed to the luxury, of
counsel is the nature of the inquiry being conducted. In the case of determining
eligibility for social security disability benefits, for example, the inquiry to be
conducted is not limited to the factual question of whether the claimant suffers from
a medical disability, but rather involves a mixed question of law and fact as to what
amount (if any) of disability benefits to which the particular claimant is entitled. 3 ,
In the case of the Guantanamo detainees, however, the hearings do not face such a
complex question. The single issue to be determined in each detainee's case is
whether that detainee fought against the United States.
It cannot be emphasized enough that this is a question distinct from whether the
detainee is an unlawful combatant who was never entitled to prisoner of war
protection or forfeited such protection. As Justice O'Connor noted in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,3 32 there is debate about the scope and definition of the term "enemy
combatant" as used by the administration.333 In fact, the government's use of the
term "enemy combatant" has no doubt caused confusion about the legal issues
involved.M It would be preferable to use the term "unlawful combatant" to describe
those detained at Camp Delta whom the government has decided not to accord
prisoner-of-war status (realizing that this decision is controversial and questionable
as a matter of international law), and to reserve the term "enemy combatant" for
those who simply have engaged in armed conflict against the United States. Used
in this sense, "enemy combatants" would be entitled to prisoner of war status, but
they would also be subject to detention for the duration of the war. "Unlawful
combatants," on the other hand, would not be entitled to prisoner of war status and
could be prosecuted in military tribunals for violating the laws of war.335 Whether
a given detainee is an unlawful combatant, as opposed to an enemy combatant,
presents a more difficult mixed question of law and fact, as it requires a deter-
mination of not just the historical facts, but also of the legal issues surrounding
whether particular conduct constitutes a violation of the laws of war.
Understood in these terms, any combat soldier- especially an officer - should
be able to help a detainee address allegations of being an enemy combatant.
American soldiers receive training on rules of engagement, which are "a condensed
131 See Mashaw, supra note 235, at 42 (explaining that disability benefits claimant was
concerned "not necessarily with the 'veracity' of the medical evidence but rather with the
capacity of a disability adjudicator to make a decision about his disability without seeing him
and his response to his medical problem"); see also Buss, supra note 282, at 609 (arguing
that schoolchildren facing disciplinary hearings should be allowed to bring counsel because
"the student is likely to be charged under the authority of a generally-worded statute or
rule").
332 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004).
333 Id.
334 See id.
33' Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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version of the laws of war. 336 In the easiest case, uniformed members of regular
armed forces subject to an internal disciplinary system are combatants,337 though
the term is not limited to such persons. Participants in a "levee en masse" - that
is, spontaneous defense from an invasion - are also considered combatants.33
Civilians, or non-combatants, on the other hand, are persons who are not part of the
armed forces, who do not take part in a levee en masse, 339 and who do not otherwise
take part in the armed conflict.3" The reason soldiers must be able to distinguish
combatants from civilians is that, under the laws of war, the latter are not lawful
targets.' In fact, this obligation to distinguish has been described as "one of the
foundations of humanitarian law. ' ' "
Of course, drawing that crucial distinction is not always easy. For example,
consider "the town also harbouring, besides the civilian inhabitants, units of armed
forces, or the stream of civilian refugees intermingled with an army retreating in
disorder."" It is easy to see how soldiers may have trouble distinguishing civilians
from combatants in those situations. But that is true because of the fog of war and
incomplete information available to the soldier at the time he is deciding whether
to shoot. If the soldier knew which persons in the town were shooting at him, he
would know who the combatants were. Similarly, if the soldier knew which
retreating persons were in uniform and/or carrying weapons, he would know who
the combatants were. The problem identified in these scenarios is a lack of precise,
real-time information, not a lack of ability to draw appropriate distinctions if given
that information.
Given the limited nature of the factual inquiry to be resolved by the tribunals,
the presence of legal counsel to assist the detainee might not be deemed necessary.
For substantially similar reasons, the Court in Wolff held that inmates facing
disciplinary proceedings were not entitled to have counsel present, though in cases
where the inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex, the inmate should be free to
seek help from another inmate or "adequate substitute aid in the form of help from
the staff."3" Similarly, in Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,345 in
336 See Paul Maliszewski & Hadley Ross, We Happy Few: The U.S. Soldier's Laws of
War, in Principle and in Practice, HARPER'S MAG., May 2003, at 56.
337 See, e.g., FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANrrARIAN
LAW 50 (Laura Brav ed. & trans., 2002); FREDERIC DE MULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF WAR FOR ARMED FORCES 12 (1987).
338 DE MUUNEN, supra note 337, at 12.
331 id. at 13.
340 LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 128 (CDR Brian J. Bill ed., 2000).
31 See Geneva Convention, supra note 208.
342 BOUCHET-SAULNIER, supra note 337, at 45.
343 FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 99
(2001).
34 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974). Of course, many criminal trials also
may reduce to fairly simple questions of fact; yet, indigent criminal defendants cannot be
20051
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
upholding a federal statute limiting attorneys fees in veterans death or disability
benefits proceedings, the Court noted that "[s]imple factual questions are capable
of resolution in a nonadversarial context, and it is less than crystal clear why lawyers
must be available to identify possible errors in medical judgment." 6 Indeed,
Powell v. Alabama347 suggests that the need for counsel arises acutely (though
certainly not solely) from the technical aspects of litigation, criminal law, and the
rules of evidence. 348 Again, this is not to deny that lawyers would be able to help
the detainees present more effective cases. However, it does suggest that the
marginal gain in accuracy from having lawyers present is measured from a different
baseline than in the criminal cases: there are not complex rules of litigation to
contend with, the issue to be resolved is relatively simple and factual, and to the
extent there are complexities in the definition of "combatant," the personal
representative should have the training to assist the detainee.
Still, the reasons for prohibiting lawyers in this context seem less plausible than
in Walters and Wolff. In Walters, the stated concern was ensuring that veterans not
lose too much of their benefits to lawyers; this concern was addressed by imposing
a $10 limit on attorneys' fees in benefit recovery cases.34 9 If the result of the fee
limit was that no lawyers would take those cases, Congress could still have
rationally concluded that the gain to a veteran of keeping his entire benefits recovery
(rather than two-thirds) outweighed the loss of not having an attorney represent him,
even if that meant a slightly lower chance of recovery. No such desire to protect an
interest of a Guantanamo detainee is plausibly present here.
deprived of the right to counsel even in such cases. But that is because the Sixth Amendment,
in effect, sets a floor for procedural due process in criminal cases, guaranteeing the right to
counsel (including appointment of counsel for the indigent).
5 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
346 Id. at 330.
-7 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
348 Id. at 69.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid
of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible.
Id.; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTTUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLEs 139 (1997) (noting that criminal counsel are useful for understanding how to file
pre-trial habeas petitions, how to interpret the "technical jargon" of the indictment, and how
to understand the rules of evidence).
141 Walters, 473 U.S. at 307.
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Wolff is a better analogy because, in that case, the argument against lawyers
rested on the characterization of disciplinary hearings as "non-adversarial. 3 0 While,
of course, the inmate would desire not to be disciplined, his interests were not in
conflict with the interests of the prison authorities because the purpose of the
discipline was to assist in his rehabilitation."' Having lawyers present would retard
that rehabilitation by turning the hearings into the inmate versus the prison. Here, by
contrast, the combatant status review hearings cannot lay claim to the same purpose
of rehabilitation - indeed, the very purpose of the hearings is to justify continued
detention of the detainee on the basis that he is an enemy of the United States.
When we turn to the burdens on the government of allowing representation by
counsel, the obvious government concerns are logistics and security. Because the
detainees are being kept at a military base located on an island owned by a hostile
country, the government would have to arrange for transportation of attorneys from
the United States to Guantanamo Bay. In addition, if counsel do not already possess
sufficient security clearance to receive classified material,352 then the government
will have to go through the effort of performing background checks on the attorney,
or else the attorney may be denied access to classified material.5 3 One court has
noted an estimate of two months for the Department of Justice to conduct a
background check for a defense attorney's security clearances.354 Finally, the
government has argued in other contexts that allowing lawyers to meet with enemy
combatants will interfere with ongoing interrogations of those detainees.355
However, these burdens do not appear significant under current conditions, for
the government is now "accepting applications for security clearances to allow
attorneys who have pending court challenges to see their clients. 3 6 Because the
government has already indicated an ability and willingness to solve the logistical
and security issues, there seems to be little basis for keeping attorneys from
representing the detainees at the hearings. Furthermore, the interest in effective
interrogations of detainees not only wanes with the passage of time (as whatever
information of value a detainee may have becomes stale), but it is also completely
belied, again, by the government's willingness to allow selected attorneys to meet
350 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-69 (1974).
151 Id. at 563.
... Cf. Tribunal Order, supra note 266, at para. c (specifying that detainee's personal
representative shall have proper security clearance so as to be able to access all relevant
information, which may be shared with the detainee save classified material).
353 See id.
31 See United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
151 See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d42, 49-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 124
S. Ct. 2711 (2004); E.A. Torriero, Guantanamo Braces for Change, CHI. TRtB., July 12,
2004, at 1.
356 Ian James, Journalists Allowed in Selected Tribunals, ASsOCIATED PRESS ONLINE,
Aug. 5, 2004, Westlaw, Allnewsplus Database.
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with detainees regarding court proceedings. The government might, theoretically,
be able to justify exclusion of attorneys - for example, if the number of detainees
were much higher than the current number of fewer than 600, and due to other
circumstances, there simply was no feasible way of conducting background checks
and processing security clearances fast enough. However, that theoretical justifi-
cation does not appear to stand here.
3. Summary
The Tribunal Order issued by Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz provides a
framework for a hearing that, under the circumstances, can satisfy the requirements
of due process with appropriate modifications: providing summaries of classified
information that forms part of the basis for the initial classification of the detainee
as a combatant, and allowing voluntary counsel to appear on behalf of the detainee.
Of course, reasonable minds can disagree about the application of the Eldridge
balancing test, and habeas courts could conclude that the process is sufficient, or that
more significant modifications are necessary.
Furthermore, we should be mindful of Judge Friendly's admonition that the
various elements of a fair hearing not be considered separately." 7 Thus, it may be
if the government allows a lawyer to represent a detainee at the hearing, there is less
need for the government to provide sunmmaries of the classified information, because
the lawyer will be able to probe the weakness of the government's unclassified
presentation.35
As currently constructed, the Tribunal Order may raise some due process
problems, but remedying such problems would be fairly straightforward: the
government would have to hold a new hearing with those procedures. In the state
prisoner cases, for example, when a federal habeas court concludes that a state
prisoner's trial was constitutionally defective, the usual remedy is a conditional
release order that gives the state an opportunity to retry the defendant.359 There are
a few instances in which habeas corpus results in an order for unconditional
release, but those instances occur "when a court concludes that the fact of the
prosecution and not simply the manner in which the prosecution occurred violates
... Friendly, supra note 241, at 1279.
358 See Buss, supra note 282, at 610 (noting that in the school discipline context, where
the right to cross-examination is denied, "participation by a lawyer becomes even more
imperative to reveal weaknesses in hostile testimony and to identify weaknesses in the
testimony that cross-examination might have exposed").
359 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993) ("The typical relief granted in
federal habeas corpus is a conditional order of release unless the State elects to retry the
successful habeas petitioner...."); Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,775 (1987) ("[T]his
Court has repeatedly stated that federal courts may delay the release of a successful habeas
petitioner in order to provide the State an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation
found by the court.").
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the Constitution. ' '360 Examples include prosecutions in violation of the protection
against double jeopardy, ex post facto, and vindictive prosecution.16 ' However,
none of those examples applies to the government's detention of suspected com-
batants. There is, for example, no serious argument to be made that the President
could not constitutionally detain properly classified combatants pursuant to his
war-making powers, augmented here by Congress's authorization of the use of
military force.
3 62
Ill. REFLECTIONS ON RASUL
As discussed earlier, the Court's reasoning in Rasul is generally unpersuasive,
consisting of a strained interpretation of both the habeas statute itself as well as the
Court's past decisions in Ahrens, Eisentrager, and Braden.363 The opinion leaves
the reader unsure as to whether this really is a case about extraterritorial application
of the habeas statute, or an expansion of the definition of custodian (which would
conflict with Padilla). Moreover, the extension of the privilege of habeas corpus to
the Guantanamo detainees may well result in little more than the combatant status
review hearings.36" Yet, despite the analytic flaws of the opinion, and despite the
potentially limited nature of relief to be afforded to the detainees, Rasul actually
achieves a workable balance between judicial abdication and judicial intrusiveness
in the war on terrorism.
A. Political Inertia
First, we should consider whether it was appropriate for the Court to step into
the matter of the Guantanamo detainees by interpreting the habeas statute the way
360 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 33.2 (4th ed. 2001).
361 2 id. at 1500-02.
362 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) ("The capture and detention of
lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal
agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war."') (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 28 (1924)); id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The Executive Branch, acting pursuant to the powers vested in the
President by the Constitution and with explicit congressional approval,
has determined that Yaser Hamdi is an enemy combatant and should
be detained. This detention falls squarely within the Federal
Government's war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to
second-guess that decision.
Id.
363 See supra Part I.B.
364 As discussed earlier, the combatant status hearings may well satisfy due process, and
any claims purportedly brought under the Geneva Convention must overcome the hurdle of
lack of self-execution of that treaty.
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that it did, as opposed to leaving it to the political branches to act first. Recall that
Justice Scalia suggested that the plight of the detainees should be a matter for
Congress to address.3 65 Justice Scalia is surely correct that Congress could have
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to include a provision addressing extraterritorial habeas
petitions. For example, § 2241 could be supplemented by a new subsection (e),
which would read: "For the purposes of this section, the 'respective jurisdiction' of
the District Court for the District of Columbia shall include any location where a
person is being detained under the authority of the United States; and in such
cases, the custodian shall be deemed the Attorney General or other such appropriate
federal official." 3"
There are significant pragmatic and structural arguments in favor of having
Congress address the problem in the face of concerns about the flooding of federal
courts with habeas petitions by enemy aliens.67 Congress has the power, within
certain limits,36 to alter the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Subject-matter jurisdiction consists of those heads of jurisdiction set forth in Article
III, section 2, including but not limited to cases "arising under" federal law and
cases involving diversity of citizenship. Article III, section 2 represents a universe
of possible cases that federal courts can hear; however, it is up to Congress to vest
that jurisdiction by statute.369 As early as 1799, the Court explained that "the
disposal of the judicial power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to
congress.... [C]ongress is not bound.., to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal
Courts, to every subject, in every form, which the Constitution might warrant. 370
In fact, Congress has, from the start, refused to vest federal courts with the whole
of the judicial power: general federal question jurisdiction did not exist until 1875,371
and even then, for the next 105 years, was subject to an amount-in-controversy
requirement.37 Similarly, diversity of citizenship cases have been subject to a
365 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2711 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31 See, e.g., Demjanjukv. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Exparte Hayes,
414 U.S. 1327, 1327 (1974) (transferring habeas petition by American soldier overseas to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia).
367 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
368 The actual limits remain fascinating to academics, who continue to debate such matters
as whether Congress can withdraw subject-matter jurisdiction of "disfavored" rights such as
those protected by the Establishment Clause or equal protection, or abortion. The classic
treatment is exemplified in Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
Periodically, Congress has attempted to pass jurisdiction-stripping statutes to undo contro-
versial Supreme Court decisions, but these bills have generally not been enacted. See also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONsTrrtnMONAL CHOICES 47--65 (1985).
369 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
370 Turner v. Bank of N.-Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799).
"' Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
372 See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, §
1, 94 Stat. 2369.
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consistently increasing amount-in-controversy requirement.373 While the amount-in-
controversy requirement increases cannot be explained solely by reference to case
load reduction pressure,374 it is apparent that one purpose of the increases was to
reduce the number of diversity of citizenship cases filed in federal courts. 375
Thus, in a full-scale traditional war between the United States and other nation-
states involving thousands (or tens of thousands) of captured foreign combatants,
Congress could simply refuse to allow habeas jurisdiction for such persons. In a
situation where the number of detainees is much more manageable, however,
Congress could provide habeas jurisdiction, provide review in an Article I court
such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, or create a new
forum to hear detainee cases on original jurisdiction.376 The point is that Congress,
given its constitutional power to alter the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts,
may be in a superior institutional position to determine whether opening our federal
courts to suspected enemy aliens is desirable. If we are talking about 595 detainees,
the federal courts can probably handle the petitions; if we are talking about 500,000
prisoners of war, then perhaps not.
Additionally, leaving it to Congress to devise the appropriate forum for testing
the combatant status avoids a potential Suspension Clause problem that is caused by
extending the habeas statute. The exact scope of the Suspension Clause has been
subject to vigorous debate: one view is that the clause protects the scope of the writ
as it existed at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.377 Another view is that
the clause does not protect any minimum guarantee of habeas, but rather protects
against suspension of whatever habeas right that Congress enacts.3 78 To date,
171 Since 1789, when the amount-in-controversy requirement was set initially at $500, see
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78, Congress has raised the requirement five
times (1887, 1911, 1958, 1988, 1996) to its present amount of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (2000).
374 See Thomas E. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy
Requirement: A Proposal to "Up the Ante " in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 317
(1984).
171 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 93 (1996). As
Judge Posner reports, the number of diversity-of-citizenship cases brought in federal courts
dropped by thirty-three percent and twenty-eight percent following the 1958 and 1988
increases in the amount-in-controversy requirements.
376 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Terrorism-Cases Demand New Hybrid Courts, L.A. TIMES,
July 9, 2004, at B 13.
371 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,663-64 (1996).
378 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (noting that the First Congress
passed legislation authorizing federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus, "for if the means
be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension
should be enacted"); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 339-40 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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however, the Court has refused to decide which interpretation is correct.379 Under
the first view, Congress would be free to amend 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to override
Rasul's interpretation of the statute without running afoul of the Suspension Clause.
Indeed, Congress could do so with respect to pending cases. 0 However, if the
second view prevails - in effect, that the Suspension Clause acts as a one-way
ratchet on the scope of federal habeas corpus - then Congress might not be able to
amend § 2241 to override Rasul.
But can Congress be expected to amend statutes to eliminate jurisdictional
gaps? One example is the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000,381
which remedied the problem whereby American civilians accompanying U.S.
military forces overseas were de facto immune from prosecution for crimes
committed on U.S. bases. Prior to the Act, such civilians could not be court-
martialed because they were not members of the armed forces,382 and they could
not be prosecuted under federal criminal law because no Article In court could
claim jurisdiction or venue to try them. 383 The Act fixed this gap by providing, in
relevant part, that a person "employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces
outside the United States" who commits a crime outside the United States that
would be a crime punishable by more than a year in prison if committed within the
United States (including its special maritime jurisdiction) shall be punished "as
provided for that offense."
384
Admittedly, the pressure to enact this Act came largely from the Department of
Defense." 5 The inability to prosecute American civilians who committed crimes on
military bases in foreign countries proved embarrassing
386 and demoralizing.38 7
171 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n.13 ('The fact that this Court would be required to
answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in and of itself a
reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding
that review was barred entirely.").
380 See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
381 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
382 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3 (1957).
383 See, e.g., United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 2000). But see United
States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that jurisdiction existed with 18
U.S.C. § 7(3)'s special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 887
(2001); United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876
(1973).
31 Section 804 of the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), later
added subsection (9) to 18 U.S.C. § 7, which expanded the definition of the "special
maritime jurisdiction" of the United States to include military bases in foreign countries -
thus including Camp Delta.
383 See Mark J. Yost & Douglas S. Anderson, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act of 2000: Closing the Gap, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 446, 446-47 (2001).
386 See, e.g., Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 210 (denying jurisdiction in case where civilian was
accused of sexually assaulting a minor on a U.S. military base in Germany).
387 See Yost & Anderson, supra note 385, at 448 (describing testimony of a U.S. General
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The Act further helped the Department of Defense in negotiating Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAs) between the United States and foreign nations that set forth
the priority of prosecution involving U.S. forces based overseas. As two commenta-
tors note, "The position of a U.S. delegation negotiating provisions of a SOFA on
foreign criminal jurisdiction is strengthened by assuring the receiving state that, if
it declines to prosecute, the United States has both jurisdiction and the will to
prosecute Americans accused of committing crimes within that state's territory.""3 '
The arguments in favor of leaving to Congress the decision to extend the habeas
statute to places outside the United States are not trivial. Congress has the tools to
fill jurisdictional gaps and on occasion has done so. On the other hand, the argu-
ments against Congress having the final say are strong. Unlike federal judges,
whose life tenure and protection from salary diminution are presumed to provide a
measure of independence, the members of Congress are answerable to the electorate.
Nonresident aliens detained as suspected terrorists obviously are not constituents to
whom representatives or senators would feel obligations to help. Nor are they likely
to be viewed as sympathetic victims of government oppression. Thus, David Cole
argues that, "precisely because noncitizens do not enjoy the franchise, and therefore
cannot rely on the political process for their protection, it is all the more critical that
they be accorded basic human rights enforceable in court. 38 9 In other circum-
stances, the Court has recognized that judicial review is necessary to counteract the
tendency of legislatures to discriminate in favor of constituents at the expense of out-
side non-constituents. Indeed, the insight that political restraints cannot be counted
on in all instances to restrain legislatures is one of the primary justifications for the
Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence: to guard against this sort of exploi-
tation of outsiders.39 Thus, the Court stepped in to strike down state laws that
provide tax credits for ethanol produced in-state but not out-of-state,39' that charge
higher surcharges for disposal of out-of-state waste than in-state waste,3 92 that allow
of the frustrating case where the civilian husband severely beat his military wife, and could
be punished only by "put[ting] him on an airplane and send[ing] him home").
388 Id. at 447.
389 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 957 (2002); cf Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to evaluate state laws
prohibiting or limiting noncitizens from receiving public assistance).
390 See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) ("[T]he Court has
often recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside
the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally
exerted when interests within the state are affected."); see also Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin,
State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach, 1998
SuP. CT. REV. 193,227-28 (discussing the possibility of states' exploiting natural advantages
or geographic positioning to lower tax burdens of in-state residents).
"' New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
392 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envt'l Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
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longer tolling of the statute of limitations when out-of-staters are sued, 93 that prevent
out-of-state (but not in-state) generated waste from being dumped into landfills, 3
94
and a whole host of other discriminatory state laws. In fact, when it comes to state
laws that discriminate facially against outsiders, the Court presumes invalidity.395
A related concern explains the Court's famous footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,396 in which the Court applied "rational basis" review to
uphold a federal law prohibiting interstate shipment of "filled milk," but set aside
the question of "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry., 397 John Hart Ely built upon
the footnote four theory in Democracy and Distrust to argue that judicial review
could be justified as a countermajoritarian instrument only as a "representation-
reinforcing" device - that is, to correct failures of representation.398
The representation-reinforcing justification does not, by itself, translate into a
doctrinal victory for enemy aliens. It may be that enemy aliens have no consti-
tutional rights (though I am not making that argument here), and that therefore
judicial review would have no impact on their individual situations. Instead, I am
merely acknowledging that, as a normative matter, the very concerns giving rise to
the dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, footnote four of Carolene Products,
and the representation-reinforcing theory are present with full force in the case of
nonresident aliens detained outside the United States.
Therefore, relying on Congress and/or the President to act may be problematic.
Certainly, neither Congress nor the President gave much indication of an intent to do
anything other than leave it to the executive branch to decide how long to continue
detaining the suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters at Guantanamo Bay. One
might conclude that nothing would have changed but for the Court's decision. 399
The institutional paralysis that appears to have afflicted Congress may be a
sufficient ground for applauding the Court's decision to take the initiative and inter-
pret the habeas statute the way it did. Before so concluding, however, we should
acknowledge that the United States does not exist in a vacuum where the only
players are the federal courts, Congress, the President, and the electorate. Even if
... Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
" City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
39- See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,337 (1979) (holding that discriminatory
laws require "the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the
absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives").
396 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
397 Id. at 152 n.4.
398 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDIcIAL REVIEw 181
(1980).
" Note, however, that Secretary Rumsfeld did announce plans for tribunals prior to the
Court's decision in Rasul.
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American voters may not be sufficiently swayed by the plight of the detainees at
Camp Delta to motivate Congress or the President to act on their behalf, the inter-
national community has applied consistent pressure on the Bush administration to
change its legal position regarding Camp Delta.4 ° For example, numerous detainees'
home nations have engaged in diplomatic efforts on their behalf. Eisentrager implied
that the recourse available to enemy aliens being detained outside United States
territory was that available to a United States citizen being detained elsewhere by
a foreign power: "When any citizen is deprived of his liberty by any foreign govern-
ment, it is made the duty of the President to demand the reasons and, if the detention
appears wrongful, to use means not amounting to acts of war to effectuate his
release."40' Naturally, there is no guarantee that international pressure would cause
the President or Congress to act. But diplomatic efforts by other nations have paid
dividends in some instances; the United States has released a number of detainees
to their home countries, in some instances even before the Court decided Rasul.40 2
In the end, the Court's decision to interpret the habeas statute the way it did is
best justified by analogy to the dormant commerce clause cases. Just as Congress
retains the ultimate power to overrule the Court's dormant commerce clause
4 See, e.g., supra note 8 (identifying criticisms of Camp Delta).
40 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950). The Iran hostage crisis provides an
apt example of efforts that the President took to free American detainees. On November 4,
1979, militant Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Iran and held fifty Americans
hostage, an action that the revolutionary government essentially ratified. During the 444 days
that the hostages were held in violation of international law, President Carter took a variety
of actions aimed at coercing the Iranian government into releasing the hostages. Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
34 (May 24). He froze Iranian assets in the United States, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981), filed a claim against Iran before the International Court of Justice, obtained
two UN Security Council Resolutions calling for the release of the hostages, and pressured
the foreign ministers of the European Economic Community to agree to impose economic
sanctions on Iran if no real progress was made. NATALINO RONZrlTI, RESCUING NATIONALS
ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANrrY
41-43 (1985). Of course, President Carter did not confine himself to "means not amounting
to acts of war," as he also ordered a military rescue effort; unfortunately, the April 24, 1980
rescue attempt was aborted after two helicopters crashed into each other in the Iranian desert.
Id. at 43-44. The point is not that other nations should respond to the detention of their
citizens at Camp Delta by planning rescue missions, but rather that international diplomacy,
not internal Iranian judicial processes, contributed to the release of the American hostages.
402 See, e.g., John Daniszewski, 5 Britons Held at Guantanamo To Be Released, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A3; Former Guantanamo Detainee Out on Bail, L.A. TIMES, July
14, 2004, at A17 (released to Spain); Kim Murphy, Russia Releases 7 Men U.S. Held at
Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A3 (released to Russia in February 2004); U.S.
Releases 15 More from Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at A16 (released to
Afghanistan, Turkey, Tajikistan, Sudan, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen).
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decisions °3 - and has done so on occasion4° - Congress arguably retains the
ultimate power to override the Court by amending the habeas statute.
B. The Court as Nagging Conscience
If the arguments for and against the Court's intervention are both plausible, then
it is worth considering the result of Rasul as a pragmatic matter. Comparison of the
Court's ruling in Rasul with that in Korematsu v. United States,0 5 one of the most
reviled decisions in Supreme Court history, is instructive.
During World War II, three months after Japan's devastating attack on Pearl
Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which authorized military
commanders:
[T]o prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as
[they] may determine, from which any or all persons may be
excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to
enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions
[they] may impose in his discretion."°
Pursuant to this executive order, General DeWitt, the Military Commander of the
Western Defense Command, issued a series of orders applicable to citizens and
aliens of Japanese descent across the West Coast that set curfews, excluded them
from certain locations, and ultimately "relocated" them to internment camps.4 7 In
Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent was convicted of remaining in
San Leandro, California, when Exclusion Order No. 34 required persons of Japanese
ancestry, regardless of citizenship, to report to "assembly centers" - a prelude to
relocation. ° Justice Black wrote the following passage:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were presented,
merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from
403 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383,401 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
" See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); Jason E. Prince,
New Wine in Old Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Shipment Laws in the Context of
Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1563, 1607-08 (2004).
405 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
406 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
407 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
408 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214.
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the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire.... 409
And Justice Black upheld the constitutionality of Exclusion Order No. 34.41"
The three dissents in Korematsu highlighted different problems, and it is
Justice Murphy's dissent - "universally lauded as 'one of democracy's great
documents' 4 1 1 _ that is relevant here.412 Justice Murphy's dissent is often charac-
terized as complaining of overinclusiveness 413 - that is, while apparently conceding
that the military had cause to take some kind of action to guard against sabotage and
invasion, 14 he thought the exclusion order swept far and included too many
innocent persons ("over 112,000 potential enemies") within its ambit.4 " There is,
however, a second dimension to the dissent: lack of procedural due process.
416
Considering that the various curfew orders, exclusion orders, and relocation orders
were spread out over a matter of months, with the last being issued almost a year
409 id. at 223.
410 Id. at 219.
411 Matthew J. Perry, Justice Murphy and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
Doctrine: A Contribution Unrecognized, 27 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 243, 245 (2000) (quoting
Letter of Norman Thomas to Frank Murphy (Jan. 6, 1945), in SIDNEY FiNE, FRANKMURPHY:
THE WASHINGTON YEARS 450 (1985), and J. WOODFORD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A
PoLITICALBIOGRAPHY 337 (1968)); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the
Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 781, 803 (2000) (describing Justice Murphy's
dissent as being "considered the strongest" of the three dissents in Korematsu).
41' Justice Roberts concluded that Korematsu' s conviction violated due process because
Korematsu had been subjected to "two conflicting orders, one which commanded him to stay
and the other which commanded him to go." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 232 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting). Justice Jackson concluded that the exclusion order was underinclusive in that it
singled out those of Japanese ancestry, leaving free those of Italian or German ancestry. Id.
at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
413 See Note, Making Outcasts Out of Outlaws: The Unconstitutionality of Sex Offender
Registration and Criminal Alien Detention, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2731, 2744 (2004); Kenneth
W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 447,
487 (1989).
414 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("No one denies, of course,
that there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast who did all
in their power to aid their ancestral land.").
411 Id. at 235.
[Tihe exclusion order necessarily must rely for its reasonableness
upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have
a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage and to aid
our Japanese enemy in other ways. It is difficult to believe that
reason, logic or experience could be marshaled in support of such
an assumption.
Id.
416 Id. at 241-42.
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after the Pearl Harbor attack, Justice Murphy thought it impossible that the military
could not have held "loyalty hearings for the mere 112,000 persons involved - or
at least for the 70,000 American citizens - especially when a large part of this
number represented children and elderly men and women" and when Great Britain
managed to hold a comparable number of hearings for enemy aliens in a similar time
frame.417 In other words, Justice Murphy decried the absolute lack of procedural due
process afforded to the internees (at least, those who were American citizens) before
they were excluded from the West Coast.
The lack of U.S. loyalty hearings prior to exclusion and internment of these
individuals is even more striking when one considers that the government did in fact
hold hearings after internment. 1 8 The internees were subjected to a lengthy series
of questions that ultimately resulted in the release of some internees from the intern-
ment camps on temporary bases for education, work, or military enlistment.41
While the overall paranoia and racism of the majority opinion in Korematsu
would be difficult to defend as a moral principle even if Justice Murphy's suggested
loyalty hearings had been held, perhaps the decision could be justified as a matter
of modem constitutional law. Exparte Endo421 almost suggests as much; in holding
that Endo had to be released from the internment camp because she, an American
citizen, had not been proven to be disloyal,422 the subtext could easily be read as
disgust with the government's failure even to try to prove disloyalty. Put another
way, suppose that the government had excluded and interned all persons of
Japanese, German, and Italian descent (alien and citizen), thus eliminating the racial
417 Id. at 242 & n.16.
418 See ERic K. YAmAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 197 (2001). This is not to defend the questionnaire, which
had severe wording problems sometimes leading to even harsher treatment for those who
answered certain questions the wrong way. Id. at 216.
419 Id. at 197.
420 For example, why single out those of Japanese descent for loyalty hearings, and not
those of German descent? The common response is that, in the wake of Pearl Harbor, there
was great concern that the Japanese would invade the West Coast, and that those of Japanese
descent here would somehow aid Japan. Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo.
L. REV. 903 (2004). Yet, by mid- 1942, the Japanese Imperial Navy had suffered the crippling
loss of four aircraft carriers at the Battle of Midway, such that a land invasion was
considerably unlikely. Stephen Paul Coolbough, Comment, Raiders ofthe Lost... Sub? The
Potential for Private Claims of Ownership to Military Shipwrecks in International Waters:
The Case of Japanese Submarine 1-52, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 929, 1005-06 (2001). Moreover,
by that same time, eight German saboteurs had not only sneaked into the United States, they
were in fact assisted by American citizens (primarily, relatives of a few of the saboteurs). See
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). One would think that such facts would, in light of the
paranoia reflected in Justice Black's opinion, be more than sufficient to justify scrutiny of
German-Americans.
421 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
422 Id. at 297.
1124
[Vol. 13:1035
ARTICLE III COURTS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
discrimination aspect of Korematsu. The resulting government action would still
strike us today as unreasonable and probably unconstitutional for the reasons
identified by Justice Murphy.
But for Justice Murphy, the fact that a hearing had taken place would matter
more than the minutia of the hearing details.423 He did not specify in any detail the
nature of the hearings that he felt could have been held, but given the sheer number
of hearings that would have had to have been held, it is extremely doubtful that he
had in mind judicial proceedings. Indeed, the British hearings that Justice Murphy
cited approvingly, while described contemporaneously as "fair and just," '424
resemble the Guantanamo detainee hearings more than judicial proceedings: the
hearings were chaired by a King's Counselor (an elite lawyer, not a judge) but the
aliens were prohibited from bringing lawyers.425 The aliens were, however, allowed
to bring "an English friend ... who will vouch for his sentiments and good faith
towards Great Britain. 426
Rasul can best be defended as a shot across the bows of Congress and the
President, warning the political branches that if they do not clean up their own mess,
the Court will. Unfortunately, the only weapon in the Court's arsenal is its statutory
power to entertain habeas petitions - a blunt weapon for this purpose. Under such
an interpretation, the Court was quite successful; a little more than a week after the
issuance of its decisions, the Department of Defense issued an order establishing
hearings for detainees to challenge their combatant status. 427 Indeed, from a long-
term constitutional perspective, the cases may, as Eric Muller argues, serve as a
repudiation of Chief Justice Rehnquist's thesis, set forth in All the Laws but One,
that "in times of crisis . . . judges do not and should not interfere with wartime
actions of the Commander-in-Chief.
42g
However, this does not call for de novo review of detainee combatant
classifications. All the Rasul decision stands for, in light of its interpretation of the
habeas statute, is that the federal courts are to determine whether due process has
been met.42 9 In making that determination, the courts may defer to the executive
branch's determination of the magnitude of the burden to comply with any
423 Id. at 240-42.
424 See Robert M.W. Kempner, The Enemy Alien Problem in the Present War, 34 AM. J.
INT'LL. 443,445 (1940).
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Kathleen T. Rhem, DoD To Review Status of All Guantanamo Detainees, American
Forces Information Service, http://www.defense.govfnews/Jul2004/nO7082004_2004-
070801.html (July 8, 2004).
428 See Eric Muller, Supreme Court Sends Rehnquist to the Remainder Bin, Is That Legal?,
athttp://www.isthatlegal.org/archives/2004 07_11_isthatlegal-archive.html (July 13, 2004).
429 Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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hypothesized alternate procedures, given the general principle of judicial deference
in the arena of national security.43
Administration critics take a different view of the hearings, contending that the
combatant status review hearings are intended to undermine, or even outright defy
the Court's Rasul decision. 43 ' These criticisms tend to take the form of comparing
all the ways in which the hearings do not measure up to trial-type proceedings,
particularly on the fact that the decision makers are military officers. Certainly there
would be a lower likelihood of hidden biases creeping into the decisions if the
decision makers had fixed terms, like federal judges, or were civilians rather than
military officers who might be worried about their future careers.432 However, due
process is not about ensuring that "the procedures used to guard against an
erroneous deprivation.., be so comprehensive as to preclude any pofsibility of
error." 433 While critics of the administration's detention policy have complained
that the hearings will be inherently unfair,434 such charges seem, at best, premature.
The concerns about the independence and impartiality of the military officers are
based on speculation, and while it is not unreasonable to wonder about these
officers' ability to determine a detainee's combatant status free from influence, we
might not want to require the government to institute procedures aimed at stamping
430 See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 818 (1992); Dep't of the Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518,530(1988); cf. Sandinv. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995) (noting
the need for "appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a
volatile environment").
431 See, e.g., Elise Ackerman, Detainee Notification Falls Short, Critics Say, MIAMI
HERALD, July 13, 2004, at 5 (quoting Barbara Olshansky of the Center for Constitutional
Rights as saying that the government was "flouting the words of the Supreme Court"); Mary
Fitzgerald, Detainees Seeking To End Hearings Without Counsel, WASH. POST, Aug. 3,
2004, at A13 (quoting Jeff Fogel of the Center for Constitutional Rights) ("[The hearings]
are a sham. The detainees are given no access to counsel, have no right to meaningfully
contest any classified evidence against them and no meaningful way to call any witnesses
in their favor."); Charlie Savage, Detainees Fail To Win Over Hearings: Four Found To Be
Enemy Combatants, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 2004, at A2 ("[H]uman rights activists have
ridiculed the reviews as a sham, noting that the detainees are not represented by lawyers and
that the final decision remains within the military chain of command."); id. (quoting Wendy
Patten of Human Rights Watch) ("These [reviews] were not set up to be impartial."); Charlie
Savage, Tribunals To Weigh Detainees' Status: Set Up Is Response to Supreme Court's
Ruling on Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2004, at A3 (quoting Rachel Meeropol of the
Center for Constitutional Rights) ("The review procedures ... are inadequate and illegal, and
thus fail to satisfy the court's ruling.").
432 Though, of course, the independence of civilian judges might be questioned if they too
are appointed by the President.
' Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
431 See Neil A. Lewis, Fate of Guantanamo Detainees is Debated in Federal Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A36; Neil A. Lewis, Guantanamo Prisoners Getting Their Day But
Hardly in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,2004, at Al.
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out all potential problems in the absence of evidence that existing protections are
inadequate. This is not to say that federal habeas courts should refrain from acting
if there are indications of actual bias. In such instances, the court may well choose
to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve that specific factual issue; and if a court
were to conclude that the combatant status review hearing was in fact biased, relief
would be proper.
Addressing specific and identified defects in the hearing process is an altogether
different matter from levying a facial attack on the process. It is simply untenable
to read Rasul as a call for federal courts - or indeed, any court - to determine
whether the detainees were correctly classified as combatants because that is not the
purpose of habeas corpus. Because the question regarding habeas is whether the
government acted within its limited powers, here the limitations imposed by the Due
Process Clause, the hearings are not an effort to undermine Rasul; they are the
administration's effort to comply with the Rasul decision. If that compliance is
unsuccessful, then the administration will have to provide hearings that do comply.
But this would not mean that the government's initial failure to comply was an effort
to undermine, defy, or obstruct the Court, only that the government mistakenly
assumed that certain procedures would be sufficient to comply with due process.
CONCLUSION
Although the executive branch, no doubt, views Rasul as a lost battle, that is not
necessarily the case. It would be a different matter if the Court were to waken from
a long slumber (during which it has essentially acquiesced to the President in
virtually all foreign affairs)4 3 5 and intend for Article III courts to assert themselves
aggressively in policing the government's waging of the war on terrorism.
However, the narrow scope of habeas review, combined with the Court's repeated
pronouncement of the flexible nature of due process and the Court's traditional
deference to the executive branch's assessment of the value of national security,
suggest that Rasul was a reminder to the political branches to provide some process,
the form of which would be less significant than the fact that it was provided.
Thus, the sloppiness of the Rasul majority opinion, while perhaps intellectually
bothersome, need not signal the opening of the floodgates. To answer a common
criticism of extending habeas privileges to nonresident enemy aliens, what if
500,000 German soldiers during World War II had filed petitions for habeas
corpus? If such an event were to occur, the answer is easy: the federal courts would
entertain the petitions and they would conclude that under the circumstances of a
full-scale world war, the prisoners were entitled to no more due process than
whatever they received.
... This is the central thesis of HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrrY
CONsTrruTION: SHARING POWER AFrER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR (1990).
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